Accountable De-anonymization in V2X Communication by Silvennoinen, Aku




Department of Computer Science
Helsinki, December 12, 2017
Faculty of Science Department of Computer Science
Aku Silvennoinen
Accountable De-anonymization in V2X Communication
Computer Science
Master’s thesis December 12, 2017 71
V2X, ITS, de-anonymization, accountable pseudonym resolution, TEE
De-anonymization is an important requirement in real-world Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X)
systems (e.g., to enable effective law enforcement). In de-anonymization, a pseudonymous
identity is linked to a long-term identity in a process known as pseudonym resolution. For
de-anonymization to be acceptable from political, social and legislative points of view, it has
to be accountable. A system is accountable if no action by it or using it can be taken without
some entity being responsible for the action. Being responsible for an action means that the
responsible entity cannot deny its responsibility of or relation to an action afterwards. The
main research question is: How can we achieve accountable pseudonym resolution in V2X
communication systems? One possible answer is to develop an accountable de-anonymization
service, which is compatible with existing V2X pseudonym schemes. The accountability
can be achieved by making some entities accountable for the de-anonymization. This thesis
proposes a system design that enables, i) fine-grained pseudonym resolution; ii) the possibility
to inform the subject of the resolution after a suitable time delay; and iii) the possibility for
the public to audit the aggregate number of pseudonym resolutions. A Trusted Execution
Environment (TEE) is used to ensure these accountability properties. The security properties
of this design are verified using symbolic protocol analysis.
ACM Computing Classification System (CCS):
• Security and privacy ~ Privacy-preserving protocols • Security and privacy
~ Privacy protections • Security and privacy ~ Formal methods and theory of security
• Security and privacy ~ Security in hardware • Security and privacy ~ Social aspects of
security and privacy
Tiedekunta — Fakultet — Faculty Laitos — Institution — Department
Tekijä — Författare — Author
Työn nimi — Arbetets titel — Title
Oppiaine — Läroämne — Subject
Työn laji — Arbetets art — Level Aika — Datum — Month and year Sivumäärä — Sidoantal — Number of pages
Tiivistelmä — Referat — Abstract
Avainsanat — Nyckelord — Keywords
Säilytyspaikka — Förvaringsställe — Where deposited
Muita tietoja — Övriga uppgifter — Additional information





2.1 Intelligent Transportation Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 V2X Pseudonym Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2.1 Security Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2.2 Privacy Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2.3 Requirement Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2.4 Abstract Pseudonym Life Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2.5 Pseudonym Scheme Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2.6 A Security Credential Management System for V2V
Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.7 PUCA: A pseudonym scheme with strong privacy guar-
antees for vehicular ad-hoc networks . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3 Trusted Execution Environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3 Problem Definition and Adversary Model 16
3.1 Problem Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.2 Adversary Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4 Requirements 20
4.1 Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.2 Types of Pseudonym Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.3 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5 Solution Design 22
5.1 Participating Entities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.2 Data Import to Accountable Pseudonym Resolution Service
(APRS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.2.1 With Identity-Pseudonym Linkage . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.2.2 Without Identity-Pseudonym Linkage . . . . . . . . . 23
5.3 Checking IDs for Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.4 Generic Pseudonym Resolution System . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.4.1 System overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.4.2 System Interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.4.3 Variable Specifications and Visibilities . . . . . . . . . 27
5.5 More Efficient Public Forum Message (PFM)2 Checking . . . 28
5.6 Variables For Different Pseudonym Resolution Requests . . . 30
5.7 Requirements for the PF and the CIDS . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.8 Compatible Pseudonym Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
ii
6 Implementation Guidelines 32
6.1 Implementation Guidelines for the APRS . . . . . . . . . . . 32
6.2 Implementation Options for the Public Forum/CIDS . . . . . 33
7 Evaluation 35
7.1 Extended Adversary Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
7.2 Security Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7.2.1 Tamarin Prover Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7.3 How vehicles and Judges Can Trust the System . . . . . . . . 46
7.4 Integration to A Security Credential Management System For
V2V Communications (SCMS) and A Pseudonym Scheme
With Strong Privacy Guarantees For Vehicular Ad-hoc Net-
works (PUCA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
8 Related work 48
8.1 Conditional Pseudonym Resolution Algorithm in VANETs . . 48
8.2 Secure revocable anonymous authenticated inter-vehicle com-
munication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
8.3 V-Tokens for Conditional Pseudonymity in VANETs . . . . . 50
9 Conclusion 52
References 53
A Tamarin Prover Model 58
iii
Abbreviations
APRS accountable pseudonym resolution service
CID checking ID
CIDS checking ID storage
CoPRA Conditional Pseudonym Resolution Algorithm in VANETs
CPU central processing unit
DPA data protection agency
IBC identity-based cryptography
ID identifier
I.R.A.G Internal, Rational, Active and Global
LA linkage authority
LTCA long term certificate authority
PCA pseudonym certificate authority
PFM public forum message
PIA pseudonym issuing authority
PKI public key infrastructure
PUCA A pseudonym scheme with strong privacy guarantees for vehicular
ad-hoc networks
RA registration authority
REE rich execution environment
SCMS A Security Credential Management System for V2V Communica-
tions
SGX software guard extensions






Communication is an essential part of intelligent transportation systems.
The term intelligent transportation system comprises all modes of trans-
portation [17]. In intelligent transportation systems information and com-
munication technologies are utilized to achieve for instance better road safety.
intelligent transportation system communication is often referred to V2X
communication. In vehicular transport, vehicles are identifiable and track-
able because of license plates [15], but V2X communication should not make
security or privacy worse. Security and privacy are important in V2X com-
munication. Security is important because V2X communication is used for
road safety applications and privacy is important because for instance un-
controlled tracking of vehicles makes it possible to predict movements of
individuals.
Identity management systems for V2X have been the subject of exten-
sive research. The first approaches to ensure privacy were based on asym-
metric cryptography and digital pseudonyms. These approaches have been
utilised in V2X development projects and standardisation, such as SeVe-
Com [29], [26], the standard IEEE 1609.2-2016 [3], and ETSI intelligent
transportation system standards [1], [2] and [4]. Identity management can
be done by using a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) based V2X pseudonym
scheme [31]. In such schemes, concealing the vehicle’s (user’s) identity from
other users and non-authorised entities is among the highest priorities. How-
ever, in some situations the possibility to link a pseudonym to its holder is
desirable. For instance, if a vehicle escapes from an accident scene try-
ing to hide its identity. The linking is called pseudonym resolution. The
term pseudonym resolution is a synonym for the therm de-anonymization.
The term de-anonymization is understandable for a wide audience, but it
is not suitable for treating connections between long-term identities and
pseudonyms in a more granular way. Therefore the term pseudonym resolu-
tion is used in this thesis.
Pseudonym resolution schemes exist (e.g. CoPRA [8]). Pseudonym reso-
lution schemes can also be called identity escrow schemes. For a pseudonym
resolution scheme to be acceptable from political, social and legislative points
of view, it has to be accountable. In this thesis, the term accountability refers
to accountability of pseudonym resolution. In V2X, vehicles can be account-
able. In this thesis that accountability is called accountability of vehicles. An
example of accountability is the so-called obligation to inform in Swiss law,
which states that the target of resolution should, possibly after some time,
know that its identity had or has been resolved [27]. Another example of
accountability is to publish statistical information about identity resolution
activities (e.g. how many vehicle identities have been resolved etc.).
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Research Goals
The main research goal of this thesis is to answer the question:
How can we achieve accountable pseudonym resolution in V2X commu-
nication systems?
Answering this question must consider the security and privacy require-
ments in V2X communication. The approach of this thesis is to answer this
question by defining a set of requirements for accountable pseudonym reso-
lution, proposing a design for such a system, and evaluating the design in
terms of the defined requirements.
Solution Overview
The solution is a design of a generic pseudonym resolution system which is
modular by design so that it is compatible with many pseudonym schemes.
The solution is presented in Section 5. The solution introduces an account-
able entity called a judge, which authorizes a law enforcement authority to
for example resolve a pseudonym by giving a resolution order. Whenever
a pseudonym resolution happens, data of it is published. Additionally, the
judge can decide to inform targets of pseudonym resolution by sending an
order to inform. When the system receives the order, it publishes the tar-
get data and additional metadata of all the pseudonym resolutions which
are done with the related pseudonym resolution order. First, the relevant
background information, including an overview of pseudonym schemes, is
presented in Section 2. Next, the problem definition and an adversary model
are described in Section 3. Section 4 presents a set of requirements for ac-
countable pseudonym resolution. Section 5 describes the proposed solution
in detail. The security evaluation for the design is presented in Section 7.
Section 8 discusses related work, and Section 9 presents the final conclusions.
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2 Background
2.1 Intelligent Transportation Systems
Vehicular ad hoc networks are developed from mobile ad hoc networks to
enable ad hoc communication in intelligent transportation systems. vehic-
ular ad hoc network consists of Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-to-
Infrastructure (V2I) communications which are supported by for instance
IEEE 802.11p [18]. V2X denotes both V2V and V2I. The participating enti-
ties in V2X are vehicles and infrastructure elements, such as road side units.
The vehicle communicates with a system through an on-board unit.
2.2 V2X Pseudonym Schemes
Realizations of V2X pseudonym schemes are a subset of identity manage-
ment systems for V2X. The term identity management is discussed and de-
fined by Pfitzmann & Hansen [32, page 33]. In this thesis, the term identity
management system denotes a V2X identity management system which uti-
lizes pseudonyms. Since one of the goals is to present a general pseudonym
resolution service for identity management systems, it is of great importance
to treat pseudonym schemes on the abstract and general level in order to
design a compatible service. In addition, examples of pseudonym schemes
are discussed.
For a vehicle to participate to an identity management system, it should
be enrolled to it. In vehicle enrollment, a long-term identity is given for
it. Long-term identity is used for the vehicle to authenticate itself to the
identity management system.
The most important purpose of a V2X pseudonym scheme is to preserve
the anonymity of its users – vehicles. Anonymity is achieved by issuing many
pseudonyms for a vehicle so that it can periodically change the pseudonym it
uses to authenticate itself as a legitimate participant of an identity manage-
ment system. A pseudonym can be some cryptographic key material, and
in many schemes, traditional PKI certificates are used in associating these
keys to authorization data.
Thwarting tracking is also important. For instance, without tracking
thwarting in V2X, it could be possible for everyone to do mass surveillance
with relatively low resources by setting up a surveillance station network.
Tracking thwarting is a difficult problem because of for instance license
plates [15]. But if the examination is limited to only digital V2X messages,
messages to and from on-board units, tracking can be thwarted effectively
by using pseudonyms.
A realistic pseudonym scheme contains more than just pseudonym issu-
ing. Pseudonym revocation denotes that issued pseudonyms are invalidated.
Vehicle revocation denotes that a vehicle is invalidated within the system –
it cannot get valid pseudonyms anymore.
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In a pseudonym scheme, resolution information can be saved for pseudonym
resolution. Resolution information can be called also escrow data if resolu-
tion information is like an escrow – “a bond, deed, or other document kept in
the custody of a third party and taking effect only when a specified condition
has been fulfilled” [41].
2.2.1 Security Requirements
Vehicular communication should be carefully secured to maintain road safety.
Pseudonym schemes can be used as a part of preserving security in vehicular
communication.
Authentication: In vehicular communication, participants should be able
to trust received messages – they should be able to verify the authenticity
of received messages. Message authentication contains sender authentica-
tion and message integrity. Sender authenticity verification comprises at
least checking that the sender is a legitimate member of the system. This
requirements is discussed also in [33] and [36].
Accountability of vehicles: Accountability of vehicles is a natural require-
ment in vehicular communication since the environment is safety-critical.
For instance, forged warning messages should not exist without consequences.
For holding a perpetrator accountable, law enforcement authority should be
able to identify the perpetrator. Therefore for assigning liability, accountabil-
ity of vehicle is required. Accountability of vehicle covers non-repudiation.
In the V2X context non-repudiation means that a vehicle cannot deny that
it sent a message. This accountability of vehicles requirement is discussed
also in [33] (by using the term non-repudiation) and [36].
Restricted credential usage: Authentication credentials should be re-
stricted in time. This means that a credential is valid for limited time.
With time-restricted credentials, it is possible to control how many creden-
tials a vehicle has. Parallel use of pseudonyms should also be restricted. If
parallel use is not restricted, then a vehicle could mimic many vehicles at
the same time and that can lead to the so called Sybil attacks. The Sybil at-
tack refers to forging and using identities in peer-to-peer systems [14]. This
requirement is discussed also in [43] and [36].
Credential revocation: Credentials should be revocable. Revoking all
credentials of a vehicle results in excluding the vehicle from the system. It
should be possible to isolate a malfunctioning vehicle from the system. The
subject of the credential revocation can be ephemeral (pseudonyms in a
pseudonym scheme) or long-term identity credentials. This requirement is
discussed also in [21] and [36].
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2.2.2 Privacy Requirements
Privacy is critical in vehicular communication – for instance, vehicle tracking
should be thwarted as effectively as possible.
Unlinkability: Relations between items of interest should not be revealed.
Items of interest can be for example subjects, messages, and actions. Items
of interest in pseudonym schemes are long-term identities and pseudonyms.
Unlinkability of pseudonyms is important to thwart tracking (V2X commu-
nication based) effectively. This requirement is discussed also in [32] and
[36].
The opposite of the unlinkability is the linkability. Linkability means
the ability of finding out relations between items of interest.
Anonymity: Given a message, the sender of the message should be anony-
mous within the anonymity set – the set of potential message senders1. This
requirement is discussed also in [32], [31], and [36].
Trusted or distributed resolution authority: In identity resolution, the
capability to resolve should be allowed only to trusted authorities or capabil-
ity to resolve should be distributed – no single authority should be capable
of resolving identities alone. This requirement is partially discussed in [8]
(distributed resolution authority) and [36] (distributed resolution authority).
Perfect forward privacy: If one credential is resolved to an identity, then
the resolution should not reveal any information that can weaken unlinka-
bility of other credentials. This requirement is discussed also in [32] and
[36]
The authors of [36] mention the requirement of minimum disclosure
which states that revealed information of a communication participant should
be minimal. It is a good guideline for protocol designers and implementers.
2.2.3 Requirement Relations
Anonymity and accountability of vehicles requirements are in obvious con-
flict. Thus anonymity and accountability of vehicles should be balanced in
a way that the compromise satisfies at least users (vehicles) and law enforce-
ment authority. Unlinkability of a long-term identity and a pseudonym is
closely related to the anonymity requirement.
2.2.4 Abstract Pseudonym Life Cycle
In [31], the authors present an abstract pseudonym life cycle for vehicular
networks. The life cycle can be found in figure 1.
1The set of potential message senders can be for example all the vehicles in the system.
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Figure 1: Abstract pseudonym life cycle [31] © 2014 IEEE
Pseudonym issuance Vehicle Pi requests pseudonyms from the Pseudonym
Issuing Authority (PIA). If pseudonyms are issued by a PIA which is distinct
from a vehicle, then this is called third-party issuance. In turn, if a vehicle
doesn’t request pseudonyms from a distinct entity, then this is called self-
issuance. When a PIA is issuing requested pseudonyms, it retains resolution
information, though in some schemes resolution information is not saved [21].
Finally, issued pseudonyms are delivered to the vehicle. A pseudonym has
a validity time. That is why there is an interval for a vehicle to request a
new set of pseudonyms.
Pseudonym change Vehicle Pi changes its pseudonym in order to pre-
vent tracking and revealing its real identity. In other words, the vehicle
prevents the linkability of its actions by performing distinct actions under
distinct pseudonyms. If all pseudonyms are expired, then new pseudonyms
should be requested.
Pseudonym use A vehicle sends a message to another vehicle or infras-
tructure node. The message is authenticated with a pseudonym by proving
that the sender has valid credentials to the system, the pseudonym. Specif-
ically, authentication can be done for instance by signing the message with
a private key related to the pseudonym or calculating a message authenti-
cation code of the message. The receiver of the message can check that the
sender is a legitimate member of the system by verifying the message. Verifi-
cation can be done e.g. by checking a signature with a pseudonym certificate
or calculating a message authentication code. In some schemes, checking can
be done instantly, for instance in [43] if corresponding Pseudonym Certifi-
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cate Authority (PCA) certificate is available instantly. In other schemes,
for instance in [12], there is a inherent verification delay because message
authentication codes are verified in base stations.
Pseudonym revocation In many schemes, pseudonyms can be revoked.
If a pseudonym is revoked, the pseudonym cannot be used in authentication
anymore. Revocation can be used if a vehicle is misbehaving and a law
enforcement authority entity detects it. When detected, law enforcement
authority can ask a scheme specific authority to revoke a pseudonym or
pseudonyms. More realistic revocation is vehicle ID revocation. In vehicle
ID revocation a vehicle cannot get any more pseudonyms.
Pseudonym resolution Pseudonym resolution refers to linking a pseudonym
to the corresponding long-term identity or linking two or more pseudonyms
of the same holder together. vehicle ID revocation is dependent on pseudonym
resolution. Pseudonym resolution can be requested by an law enforcement
authority. A request is handled by a PIA or similar authority.
2.2.5 Pseudonym Scheme Classification
Pseudonym schemes can be divided into four classes based on the used cryp-
tography [31]. In this section, the characteristics of each class are presented.
At least pseudonym issuance and pseudonym resolution are treated for each
class since these aspects are the most relevant for pseudonym resolution.
Asymmetric Cryptography
The class covers all the schemes where asymmetric cryptography is used.
Key pairs of private and public keys are used in asymmetric cryptography.
An example of this is the SCMS system (described in section 2.2.6). In
the class, it is natural to use traditional PKI. For each key pair, there is
a certificate which contains at least the public key and a signature of the
public key. The signature is from a PIA for proving that the key pair holder
is a legitimate participant of a system. In pseudonymous certificates, there
is no data identifying a sender. Messages are signed with pseudonymous
or long-term private keys and corresponding certificates are sent within the
messages.
Pseudonym issuance in this class is similar to certificate issuance in
a PKI. Pseudonymous certificates are issued by a pseudonym provider or
similar authority.
Pseudonym use is similar to certificate use in a PKI – when a vehi-
cle sends a V2X message, it chooses a pseudonymous certificate, signs the
message with the private key for the certificate and sends the message with
the signature and the certificate. The receiver checks the signature with the
certificate and ensures that the sender is a valid member of the system just
like in a PKI.
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Pseudonym resolution can be performed in some schemes by co-
operation of pseudonym Registration Authorities (RAs), for instance [43]
(section 2.2.6). RAs have the resolution data or RAs are authorized to get
the data from pseudonym providers, certificate authorities or other author-
ities [29]. There exist pseudonym schemes where linking between vehicle’s
identity and a pseudonym cannot be resolved without vehicle’s coopera-
tion [21]. In such schemes, vehicles should provide their identities for the
resolution process.
Self-issuing is possible in asymmetric schemes. Armknecht et al. [5]
utilizes PKI+ [45] in a self-issuing pseudonym scheme. In the scheme,
pseudonym resolution is possible without help from a vehicle.
Identity Based Cryptography
IBC [38] is similar to traditional public key cryptography. In IBC, there are
also private and public keys. But in IBC, a public key is an identity, which
can be just a string, and a private key is derived from a public key. Private
keys are generated by a trusted central authority and given to vehicles. To
generate a private key for a public key in IBC all system parameters should
be known. IBC can be used in a pseudonym scheme so that all parameters
are not revealed to vehicles.
In pseudonym issuance, pseudonymous identities can be fresh strings.
In IBC-based schemes, the pseudonym provider is often called the trusted au-
thority. In addition to delivering private keys for pseudonymous identifiers,
the trusted authority delivers also parameters for signature verification.
In pseudonym use vehicles can sign messages with their private keys
and signatures can be verified with public keys which are pseudonymous.
Pseudonym resolution can be done by the trusted authority if map-
pings from long-term identities to pseudonymous identities are saved when
issuing pseudonyms.
In IBC there is no PKI nor certificates. Within an IBC system, signed
messages are just checked with identities delivered with messages. A signa-
ture can be trusted because only a centralized trusted authority knows all
the parameters and is thereby able to deliver private keys. An IBC-based
scheme can be found for instance from [25].
Group Signature Cryptography
In a group signature scheme [11], a group member can sign a message on
behalf of the group. In the V2X context, vehicles can form a group and if
a vehicle of the group signs a message with the group key a receiver can be
sure the sender belongs to the group but it cannot infer that which member
the sender is. In many group signature schemes, there is a group manager
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which is responsible for adding members and generating group parameters,
for instance, [24].
Pseudonym issuance in a group signature pseudonym scheme can be
interpreted to be public key delivery to a new member or delivery of a new
public key to each member in case of group parameters changing. Each
member has its own private key, which can also be delivered in member
addition.
In pseudonym use a sender signs a message with its private key. A
receiver can check the signature with group public key.
Pseudonym resolution in a group signature pseudonym scheme is
called signature anonymity revoking. In signature anonymity revoking, the
group manager maps a signature to a long-term identity.
In a group signature pseudonym scheme, the group manager can be a
vehicle or it can be some trusted infrastructure entity.
Symmetric Cryptography
Choi, Jakobsson, and Wetzel [12] introduced one of the first plausible sym-
metric pseudonym schemes. In the scheme, an entity called the ombudsman
generates a unique identifier and a seed value for a vehicle in the registration
phase. ombudsman and the vehicle can then calculate a set of pseudonymous
handles by hashing the unique identifier, the seed value, and a counter value.
ombudsman retains escrow data in registration.
Pseudonym issuance happens in cooperation between a vehicle and
e.g. an road side unit. A vehicle sends one of its handles to an road side unit
to request new pseudonyms. The RSU generates pseudonyms by hashing
the handle with time values. Pseudonyms are keys for a symmetric cipher.
IDs are given for generated pseudonyms. RSU retains escrow data.
In pseudonym use signing can be done by generating a hashed message
authentication code of a message. The Identifier (ID) of the used pseudony-
mous key must be provided with the signature. A receiver should send a
received message to a road side unit for verification, since the receiver does
not know the key for the ID.
Pseudonym resolution can be done by an RSU and the ombudsman.
2.2.6 A Security Credential Management System for V2V Com-
munications
SCMS [43] is a scheme that uses asymmetric cryptography and traditional
PKI. In SCMS, most of the requirements are achieved by organisational sep-
aration. For instance, pseudonym resolution data is saved in issuing process,
but in such a way that more than one authority is needed for resolution.
Trust among participants is delivered with PKI and traditional certificates.
Participating entities are shown in figure 2. In the legend of the figure 2, In-
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trinsically Central denotes that a component can have “exactly one distinct
instance for proper functioning” [43]. Whereas Not Intrinsically Central
denotes that there can be n instances of a component. As can be seen,
the system has many entities because of organizational separation. Before
pseudonyms can be issued to a vehicle, the vehicle has to be enrolled via the
Enrollment certificate authority and Device Configuration Manager in the
figure 2. In enrolment, a vehicle gets an enrollment certificate which can be
used to request pseudonyms. This section explains i) vehicle enrollment ii)
pseudonym issuance, and iii) pseudonym resolution in SCMS.
Figure 2: SCMS overall system architecture [43] © 2013 IEEE
Butterfly key expansion: SCMS uses a novel technique called but-
terfly key expansion in pseudonym issuance. It is a cryptographic scheme
where it is possible to request arbitrarily many certificates with different
key pairs. Each certificate and key pair can be encrypted with a different
encryption key. In the request, only one verification public key seed, one
encryption public key seed and two expansion functions are needed. With
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this technique it is possible to avoid a vehicle to generate and send a distinct
encryption key for each pseudonym. The main points are explained in this
section, and interested readers are referred to the paper for further details.
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) and the discrete logarithm problem are
used in this explanation. First, all parties agree on a base point G. It has
order l. A caterpillar keypair (α,αG) is formed using G and an integer α,
and αG is denoted as A. The requester defines an expansion function fk(ι),
which is a pseudo-random permutation ([22]) from integers mod l to inte-
gers mod l and delivers it to a receiver, along with A. The key k defines the
function f . If an adversary knows tuple of values and corresponding argu-
ments of a pseudo-random function, the adversary cannot derive any other
value-argument pairs without knowing the k. The receiver of the request
can then generate cocoon public keys Bι = A+ fk(ι) ∗G. In practice, the re-
ceiver calculates keys by substituting integers mod l to the variable ι one by
one. Each of the results are in the same set integers mod l. Corresponding
private key for each cocoon public key Bι is bι = α+ fk(ι), because
Bι = A+ fk(ι) ∗G = αG+ fk(ι) ∗G = (α+ fk(ι)) ∗G = bιG.
Note that α cannot be derived from A, because of the discrete logarithm
problem. Therefore public keys are known by the receiver, but the corre-
sponding private keys are known only by the requester. The final step of
the butterfly key expansion is to generate a random integer c and obtain
C = cG to get a butterfly public key Bι +C. Because
Bι + C = A+ fk(ι) ∗G+ cG = αG+ fk(ι) ∗G+ cG = (α+ fk(ι) + c) ∗G,
the private key for Bι + C is α+ fk(ι) + c.
Pseudonym Issuance
Pseudonym request: A vehicle sends a pseudonymous certificate set re-
quest which is signed with an enrollment certificate to location obscurer
proxy. In the request, the vehicle sends also public butterfly key seeds
(A, fk) and (H, fe), where A and H are second elements of caterpillar key
pairs and fk and fe are corresponding expansion functions with keys k and
e. The request is encrypted for a RA. The location obscurer proxy obscures
origin data of the message and sends it to the RA. When the RA receives
the message, it decrypts it and verifies the enrollment certificate. It pro-
ceeds with checking that is the vehicle allowed to get new pseudonyms. If
all checks succeed, then the RA sends an acknowledgement to the vehicle
and proceeds with butterfly key expansions (A, fk) and (H, fe). The tuple
of keys from the butterfly key expansion (A, fk) is denoted by B
A and the
ι-th key in the tuple is denoted by BAι . The tuple of keys from the (H, fe)
similarly.
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Request batching: The RA waits till it has enough pseudonymous
certificate requests and pre-linkage values from each of the linkage authori-
ties. Linkage authorities generate pre-linkage values for efficient revocation.
Linkage authorities are a part of the pseudonym issuance. Then the RA
shuﬄes the requests and sends all the requests to the PCA. Data sent to the
PCA consist of requests which consists of encrypted (for PCA) pre-linkage
values (plv1(i, j),plv2(i, j)), certificate validity time period i, index j and
cocoon public keys BAι and B
H
ι . Therefore each request from a vehicle to
RA leads to many requests to PCA.
Certificate generation: The PCA receives a request. It is important
that the RA should not be able to track a vehicle by linking pseudonyms to
each other. In order to achieve that, for each request, the PCA generates a
random integer c. Then the PCA obtains C = cG and generates a certificate
where the butterfly public key is BAι +C. In this way, the public key in the
certificate is hidden from the RA. PCA generates linkage value which is
XOR of the pre-linkage values and adds it to the certificate. PCA encrypts
the certificate and the integer c for the vehicle with BHι , and sends these
back to RA.
The RA relays certificates to vehicles: The RA collects responses
from the PCA and sends encrypted pseudonym certificates and correspond-
ing private key construction values (c) to vehicles. The set of all the re-
sponses is called super batch.
Information distribution: After pseudonym issuance, each linkage au-
thority has knowledge of initial linkage seed (generated normally only once)
and pre-linkage value with corresponding (i, j) values. PCA has knowledge
of pre-linkage values from each linkage authority and their corresponding
(i, j) values, linkage value, cocoon public keys BAι and B
H
ι , certificate and
hash of RA-to-PCA request. RA has knowledge of the enrolment certificate
with its validity period, public key seeds (A and H), expansion functions (fk




ι and the hash of RA-to-PCA request.
After issuance none of the involved entities alone are able to link pseudonyms
to enrollment certificates (i.e. resolve vehicles), or revoke pseudonyms.
Pseudonym Resolution
Pseudonym resolution is not supported in SCMS. First, assume that a re-
quester has an SCMS pseudonym. The requester can be for instance the
misbehaviour authority. There is a linkage value attached to the pseudonym
certificate. The requester sends the pseudonym to the PCA, which signed
the pseudonym). The PCA retrieves from its database the RA-to-PCA
hash with the pseudonym. The result is returned to the requester. Then,
the requester sends the hash to the RA. The RA sends back the enrolment
certificate. Then the requester has the corresponding long-term identity, the
enrolment certificate. However, this last step where the RA sends the iden-
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tity to the requester is not allowed in the SCMS, but it could be allowed
with minor changes to the system if the requester is trusted.
SCMS meets all the security and privacy requirements listed in Sec-
tions 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, with the exception of accountability of vehicles, because
pseudonym resolution is not supported by design. Perfect forward privacy
cannot be evaluated, because, again, pseudonym resolution is not supported.
2.2.7 PUCA: A pseudonym scheme with strong privacy guaran-
tees for vehicular ad-hoc networks
PUCA [21] is another scheme based on asymmetric cryptography and tra-
ditional PKI. It is designed with vehicles’ privacy in mind. In PUCA,
pseudonyms cannot be resolved. PUCA utilizes advanced cryptography for
preserving users unconditional anonymity, also within the system. Because
of that, PUCA is an interesting challenge from a pseudonym resolution point
of view. Cryptographic methods are used besides for organisational sep-
aration to ensure users privacy. The authors write that they wanted to
show that a scheme with unconditional vehicle anonymity can be designed.
PUCA is built on top of the CAR 2 CAR Communication Consortium’s basic
pseudonym scheme [9] and it is compatible with the standardised approach
to use PKI and pseudonymous certificates [2].
Participating entities in the system are the Long Term Certificate Au-
thority (LTCA), the PCA, the RA and vehicles. With the LTCA, vehicles
can register and obtain long-term credentials. From the PCA vehicles can
obtain pseudonyms. Vehicles can send misbehaviour reports to the RA. The
RA can revoke a vehicle. There is backend communication between LTCA
and PCA. In a revocation process, the RA and PCA communicate with each
other.
The technical details of PUCA are not discussed here because the details
are not relevant in pseudonym resolution. PUCA can be modified to allow
pseudonym resolution and needed modifications are discussed in Section 7.4.
2.3 Trusted Execution Environments
A TEE is a secure, integrity-protected environment, consisting of process-
ing, memory, and storage capabilities [16]. A TEE is isolated from the
Rich Execution Environment (REE), which is an environment containing a
traditional computer operating system.
An important characteristic of TEEs is that software running inside the
TEE is secure even if the REE is compromised (e.g. operating system com-
promise). Typical features of a TEE include secure storage, isolated execu-
tion, and platform boot integrity [6].
14
Secure Storage
Secure storage covers the functionality of storing private data (e.g. private
keys) in a TEE so that it will not be exposed to the REE but can be utilized
through specific functions offered by an interface. The TEE supports a set of
cryptographic algorithms, for instance for generating asymmetric key pairs
and releasing only the public part to the REE. Secure storage covers also
the functionality of sealing. Sealing denotes storing data outside the TEE
so that the data is secret and integrity protected.
Isolated Execution
Isolated execution means that it is possible to run a software in a TEE
so that the related REE cannot affect to the execution control flow of the
software. Note that it can be possible to interpret from the REE what
is happening inside the TEE to some extent [10]. A TEE generally does
not guarantee availability, because it can be interrupted by the REE. For
instance, if a message is sent to a TEE from outside the TEE, delivery of
a message could be intercepted by the corresponding REE or execution of
the TEE could be delayed for so long time that the sender stops waiting for
confirmation for the message. There is a strict security boundary between
the TEE and the REE and interaction between the two can be done through
the interface defined by the TEE developer.
Intel SGX
A TEE can be implemented so that it is integrated to a CPU. An example
of the approach is Intel SGX [28]. Note, in addition to the CPU, the other
hardware and firmware on the platform must also support SGX. In SGX,
enclaves are a central concept. SGX provides new CPU instructions for
hardware enforced container generation. An enclave is a protected area in
the application’s address space.
With SGX it is possible to distribute a protected part of a software in
the clear to a SGX capable machine and after setting up an enclave for
the software attest remotely that the enclave’s integrity is preserved. In
the SGX programming model software is divided into two parts: trusted
and untrusted parts. All instructions in the trusted part are executed in an
enclave.
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3 Problem Definition and Adversary Model
In this section the problem and an adversary model will be defined.
3.1 Problem Definition
For the problem definition, the following definitions are required:
Definition 1 (Pseudonym holder-linkage). A pseudonym p is holder-linked
to a vehicle v, if the p is provisioned or issued for the v by a PIA.
Note that in Definition 1, the PIA could be the vehicle itself, if the
pseudonym scheme allows self-issuing of pseudonyms.
Definition 2 (Pseudonym co-linkage). Two pseudonyms are co-linked if
they both are holder-linked to the same vehicle.
Accountability of vehicles appears to be in conflict with the pseudonym
scheme requirements anonymity and unlinkability. From the conditional
pseudonymity follows meeting of the pseudonym scheme requirement ac-
countability of vehicles.
Definition 3 (Pseudonym holder-linkage resolution). Revealing the holder-
linkage between a pseudonym and its holder.
Definition 4 (Pseudonym co-linkage resolution). Revealing the co-linkage
between two or more pseudonyms.
The term pseudonym resolution (Definition 5) refers to both pseudonym
holder-linkage resolution and co-linkage resolution.
Pseudonym holder-linkage resolution (Definition 3) leads to complete
disappearance of anonymity with respect to the set of entities which are
aware of the holder linkage. In other words, it leads to full pseudonym reso-
lution. Pseudonym co-linkage resolution (Definition 4) leads to only partial
loss of anonymity if it is assumed that none of the resolved pseudonyms were
holder-linked already. In other words, generally, co-linkage resolution is a
weaker form of pseudonym resolution.
Definition 5 (Pseudonym resolution). Pseudonym holder-linkage or co-
linkage resolution.
Pseudonym resolution has a time dimension because each pseudonym
is assumed to have a validity period. In pseudonym resolution there are
at least two time frames. First is a pseudonym resolution time frame –
pseudonym resolution within an identity system is possible in the time frame
for an authorized entity. For example, a judge can authorize law enforcement
authority to resolve a pseudonym within the next 7 days, after which time
they will need to request a new authorization. Second is a target time frame
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– only pseudonyms valid in the time frame can be resolved. Legislation
may restrict time frames or it can set minimum or maximum lengths for
the frames. For example, legislation may define a maximum pseudonym
resolution time frame length or maximum age for target pseudonyms.
Pseudonym resolution must be accountable to be acceptable from po-
litical, social and legislative points of view. The legislative point of view
depends on legislation areas, such as EU or USA. Accountability can be
achieved by enforcing availability of pseudonym resolution metadata. Pseudonym
resolution metadata can be for instance pseudonym resolution type (Sec-
tion 4), the identity of an entity who gave permission, or order to resolve and
justification for pseudonym resolution. Making statistical information about
pseudonym resolution available to the public increases the transparency of
the system. Further, the behavior of law enforcement authority and judges
can be made transparent to some degree by making pseudonym resolution
metadata statistics available. In other words, law enforcement authority and
judges can be made accountable.
A pseudonym resolution target can be informed of pseudonym reso-
lution [27]. Informing can be enforced to take place depending on the
pseudonym resolution type or informing can be optional and require the
authorization of a judge or other trusted authority.
The problem is to define an accountable pseudonym resolution system
that
– considers the time dimension of pseudonym resolution
– makes pseudonym resolution accountable
– has capability to inform a target
3.2 Adversary Model
The adversary model considers adversaries having the standard Dolev-Yao
capabilities [13], containing: intercept all communication messages, modify
or drop messages, and send falsified messages. An adversary can collude with
one or more vehicles or infrastructure entities in the system and control over
multiple entities within the system.
The model is defined like this, because it takes into account internal and
external adversaries and it has realistic message intercepting capabilities.
In the following, some adversarial entities and capabilities of the defined
adversary are discussed.
The main aim of the adversary is to perform unauthorized pseudonym
resolution, or non-accountable pseudonym resolution. In the following dis-
cussion, the term pseudonym resolution service denotes a service for resolv-
ing pseudonyms. Additionally it is assumed that the function which is al-
lowed to request pseudonym resolutions is called LEA. The verb alter covers
removing, editing, and adding data.
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The following entities could be adversarial.
Vehicles
Vehicles can interact with an identity management system and possibly, de-
pending on implementation and integration, with the pseudonym resolution
service. Therefore discussing threats following from malicious vehicles is
relevant.
Assume that the adversary controls a vehicle which is a legitimate par-
ticipant of an identity management system and that the adversary controls
additionally a pseudonym resolution service component. If the identity man-
agement system supports misbehaviour reporting messages, the adversary
could send a spoofed misbehaviour report of a target vehicle from the con-
trolled vehicle to the identity management system so that it leads to usage
of the controlled pseudonym resolution service component resulting in re-
vealing data of the target to the adversary.
The adversary could try to send a false ID data from a controlled vehicle
to the pseudonym resolution service via the PIA when it requests a new
pseudonym set. The adversary could try to alter data in the pseudonym
resolution service by commanding a controlled vehicle.
Pseudonym Issuing Authority (PIA)
The PIA is a relevant malicious entity, since in many pseudonym schemes it is
the most likely entity which could deliver linkage data of issued pseudonyms
to the pseudonym resolution service.
A malicious PIA could try to send false linkage data to the pseudonym
resolution service. When the PIA issues pseudonyms, it could send issued
pseudonyms with some other vehicle ID to the pseudonym resolution service
instead of the real vehicle ID of the real receiver of pseudonyms. Also, the
PIA could just issue pseudonyms without sending any linkage data to the
pseudonym resolution service. The controlled PIA could send all the data
sent to the pseudonym resolution service also to the adversary. These issues
are more likely issues of a related identity management system. But it does
not mean that these threats should not be considered.
Law Enforcement Authority (LEA)
Law enforcement authority is assumed to interact with the pseudonym res-
olution service.
A malicious law enforcement authority representative could try to do
unauthorized pseudonym resolution by stealing credentials from an autho-
rized law enforcement authority representative. That could lead to a sit-
uation, where some entity is accountable of unauthorized resolution. A
controlled law enforcement authority representative could also try to get
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unauthorized pseudonym resolution data from the pseudonym resolution
service without stolen credentials or it may alter data by attacking against
the pseudonym resolution service for instance by exploiting a vulnerability
of it.
Related Models
Raya and Hubaux [34] propose an adversary model for V2X. They divide
different types of adversaries with the following classification:
– Internal vs. External An internal adversary is an authenticated mem-
ber of a system, which is able to communicate with other members of
the system.
– Malicious vs. Rational A malicious adversary wants to harm to a
system and does not want personal benefits. A rational adversary is
seeking personal profit and wants to achieve its goals as silently as
possible (no more harm to a system than needed).
– Active vs. Passive An active adversary can generate packets or mes-
sages. Whereas a passive adversary can just eavesdrop on communica-
tion.
– Global vs. Local A global adversary controls many entities scattered
widely across a system. A local adversary has control over a limited
number of entities in a limited area.
The classification is also treated in [31]. With the classification, different
types of adversaries can be denoted by abbreviations, for instance, I.R.A.G
refers to an adversary which is Internal, Rational, Active and Global. The





Accountability of vehicles of a vehicle appears to be in conflict with anonymity
and unlinkability. This apparent conflict is settled by making the judge ac-
countable for mitigating anonymity or unlinkability. In other words, pseudonym
resolution is made accountable. Another methods to add accountability
to this process are informing a target of pseudonym resolution and make
pseudonym resolution transparent to some degree by delivering statistics of
pseudonym resolutions.
In the identity management system, pseudonyms contain validity time,
and it is possible to send encrypted messages to vehicles by knowing their
long-term identities. There can be one judge. A function which is allowed
to request pseudonym resolution is called law enforcement authority. There
can be one law enforcement authority representative.
4.2 Types of Pseudonym Resolution
Different types of pseudonym resolutions are listed in Table 1. The pro-
posed solution in Section 5 is designed to be compatible with wide variety
of resolution requests. Each of the requests in Table 1 are explained briefly.
1. Given a pseudonym p, a law enforcement authority can request the
corresponding holder-linked vehicle identity v
2. Given a vehicle identity v and a time frame [t1, t2], a law enforcement
authority can request the set of all co-linked pseudonyms {p1, . . . , pn}
that are holder-linked to v during that time frame
3. Given two pseudonyms, a law enforcement authority can request in-
formation (true / false) whether the given pseudonyms are co-linked
4. Given a pseudonym p and a time frame [t1, t2], a law enforcement
authority can request the set of all co-linked pseudonyms {p1, . . . , pn}
which are valid in that time frame
Table 1: Resolution requests
The first request is for finding a holder vehicle for a pseudonym. The
request demands resolving pseudonym holder-linkage.
The second request takes into account the time dimension of pseudonym
resolution. The result of the second request is all co-linked pseudonyms
which are valid in the time frame and which are holder-linked to the same
vehicle.
The third request is used to determine whether two pseudonyms are
co-linked or not. This could be extended to more than two pseudonyms, if
required.
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The fourth request is similar to the second request, but a pseudonym
is given as an argument instead of a vehicle identity. In the fourth request,
all the returned pseudonyms should be co-linked to the given pseudonym.
4.3 Requirements
Requirement 1 (Authorised pseudonym resolution). The law enforcement
authority representative can request pseudonym resolution only if the repre-
sentative is authorised by the judge. The list of possible types of resolutions
is given in Table 1
Requirement 2 (Target informing and pseudonym resolution justification
data). If pseudonym resolution happens, then the pseudonym resolution
justification data from the accountable judge must be published. If the
judge decides that the target should be informed, then, after time t decided
by the judge only holder v for the p can know that the p was resolved and
delayed pseudonym resolution justification data is published.
Requirement 3 (Statistical pseudonym resolution information). The sys-
tem must provide public statistical information regarding all the pseudonym
resolutions specifying the percentages that are co-linked vs. holder-linked
and the percentage of pseudonym resolutions which have been informed.
With justification data, the judge can defend its decision to give per-
mission to resolve. Or if the judge is malicious, the judge will be caught if
justification data is not plausible enough or it is incorrect.
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5 Solution Design
The solution is designed following the listed goals (below) and requirements
presented in the previous section.
The solution design should:
– be compatible with existing V2X pseudonym schemes (Section 2.2)
– have a trusted or distributed resolution authority
– add or replace2 accountability of vehicles to a scheme
– consider the time dimension of pseudonym resolution
– make pseudonym resolution accountable, in other words: make one or
more entities accountable for pseudonym resolution
– make it possible that pseudonym resolution is transparent to some
degree
– consider minimum disclosure
– maintain anonymity
– maintain unlinkability
– maintain perfect forward privacy
5.1 Participating Entities
Participating entities are vehicles, Pseudonym Issuing Authority (PIA), Ac-
countable Pseudonym Resolution Service (APRS), Law Enforcement Au-
thority (LEA), Judge (J), Public Forum (PF), and Checking ID Storage
(CIDS).
In the system description, all but public forum and CIDS depicts mul-
tiple such entities. For instance, there are many vehicles involved in an
identity management system. On the other hand, public forum and CIDS
are designed to be global resources – possibly distributed. APRS is logically
singular but can be replicated. Logically singular means that it does not
matter to which replica of the APRS a request is sent, because the APRS
is stateless.
Law enforcement authority depicts an entity which can request data
from APRS – request pseudonym resolution, if it has permission to do so
from a judge. Requested data can be for instance the real identity for a
pseudonym, as defined in Table 1. APRS is the most critical element in
2Replacing accountability refers to a situation where an identity management system
already meets the accountability of vehicles requirement, but possibly in a non transparent
way.
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the system because it stores all the sensitive information and decides what
information to publish to the public forum and send to law enforcement
authority. APRS is designed to be run in a Trusted Execution Environment
(TEE). Therefore law enforcement authority can ask APRS to attest that its
TEE is formed and behaving as expected. The public forum is for publishing
public messages. There are two types of these messages: PFM1 and PFM2.
A PFM2 is always related to a PFM1. Requirements for public forum can
be found from Section 5.7. The CIDS is for publishing Checking IDs (CIDs)
for vehicles.
5.2 Data Import to APRS
Since resolution is not time critical, linkage data should be available on
demand or immediately from a database. In any case, linkage data should
be available at some point. In this section, data import is divided into two
cases for better compatibility to different pseudonym schemes.
5.2.1 With Identity-Pseudonym Linkage
Data import in case where an identity management system does know link-
age between vehicle identities and pseudonyms. In this case, vehicle identity
can be delivered by the identity management system. PIA sends message
[{p1, . . . , pn}, EPKAPRS(v)]
S to the APRS, where S denotes a secure channel.
5.2.2 Without Identity-Pseudonym Linkage
Data import in case where an identity management system does not know
linkage between vehicle identities and pseudonyms (e.g. PUCA). In this
case, vehicle identity should be received from the vehicle itself. Data import
functioning can be found from figure 3. Note that in the PUCA case the
PIA is the PCA. The vehicle can ask the APRS to attest that its TEE is
correct before sending the pseudonym request message.
5.3 Checking IDs for Vehicles
In this solution, CIDs are needed for efficient PFM2 checking for vehicles. A
CIDs can be delivered to a vehicles by publishing and maintaining a CIDS.
The CIDS could be in the form as follows. The storage can be thought as an
array. A row for a vehicle in the array consists of a hash of the vehicle’s long-
term ID, a CID encrypted for the vehicle and optionally (see Section 5.5)
a sequential numbers starting point encrypted for the vehicle (for example




1. [PKtV , EPKAPRS(SV (v))]
IA




APRS → Accountable pseudonym
resolution service
V → Vehicle
v → Vehicle identity
PKtV → Vehicles V
temporary public key
[]S → A Secure channel
[]I → An Integrity maintaining channel
[]A → An Authenticated channel
 → A trusted computing entity
Figure 3: Data import
5.4 Generic Pseudonym Resolution System
5.4.1 System overview
An overview of the design of a generic pseudonym resolution system is shown
in figure 4. A PKI can be used for authentication between instances of judge,
law enforcement authority and APRS. Channels between law enforcement
authority, judge, and APRS are considered to be secure. All messages will
eventually be received (e.g. dropped messages will be resent until acknowl-
edged).
5.4.2 System Interaction
The interaction between the entities is shown in Figure 4.
Resolution request: In the first message, a law enforcement author-
ity requests permission to resolve from the judge. In the request, the law
enforcement authority sends at the desired resolution types and two time
frames in the variable α. First time frame is a pseudonym resolution time
frame – during this time frame the law enforcement authority is allowed to
resolve (send pseudonym resolution requests to the APRS so that the APRS
accepts a request). The second time frame is for limiting validity times of













2. [α, β1, β2, γ, SJ (β1, β2, γ)]
S
3. [β1, β2, γ, δ, SJ (β1, β2, γ)]
S
4. (β1, ǫ1, h(β2, ǫ2, Ekv (k), Ek(ζ), h(cid||s)), SAPRS (◦))





8. (β3, ǫ3, β2, ǫ2, Ekv (k), Ek(ζ), h(cid||s), s, SAPRS (◦))
9. APRS checks that the eighth message is
properly published
α Law enforcement authority request data
βi i:th pseudonym resolution order metadata
γ Pseudonym resolution order
δ Pseudonym resolution request
ǫi i:th pseudonym resolution metadata
ζ Target data
η Resolution response
LEA Law enforcement authority
J Judge
PIA Pseudomym issuing authority
APRS Accountable pseudonym resolution service
PF Public forum
id A pseudonym resolution order id
(included in a β1)
cid A checking id
s A salt for a hash
k A key for a symmetric-key encryption
algorithm
h A cryptographic hash function
[]S A secure channel
 A TEE
Figure 4: Generic pseudonym resolution system
Resolution order: The judge sends a response in the second message.
The response consists of α, β1, β2, γ and signature of the last three. The
signature is needed for law enforcement authority to be able to prove that
it is allowed to resolve. β1 contains pseudonym resolution metadata which
should be revealed right after pseudonym resolution and should be visible
for everyone. The metadata contains the pseudonym resolution order ID.
β1 can also contain for instance a vague reason for allowing pseudonym res-
olution. β2 should be revealed only if the judge orders so. β2 can contain
pseudonym resolution metadata, which should be revealed only after inves-
tigations. β2 contains at least the same ID (pseudonym resolution order ID)
that is included in β1, so that these two can be associated with each other.
β1 and β2 are used for making the judge accountable. Variable γ contains
the actual pseudonym resolution order. The order consists of the same com-
ponents as variable α. Additionally, there should be an law enforcement
authority identifier in the γ, because otherwise the order could be stolen
and misused. Similar components in γ and α can differ. For instance, the
judge can decide to reduce the pseudonym resolution time. Thejudge can
also decline a request completely.
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APRS request: In the third message, the law enforcement authority
sends a pseudonym resolution request to the APRS. The message contains
δ – the request itself. δ contains a pseudonym resolution ID for making
pseudonym resolution requests with the same order ID distinguishable. Law
enforcement authority can use an order to resolve multiple times. Addition-
ally, the third message contains β1, β2, γ and judge’s signature of the last
three variables. The APRS checks that the law enforcement authority is
allowed to make the request δ by comparing it to the order γ. Law enforce-
ment authority’s identity is compared to the identity in the order. APRS
checks also that the pseudonym resolution ID is fresh.
First public forum message: The fourth message is published if
pseudonym resolution happens. The message consists of order metadata
β1, delayed order metadata β2, pseudonym resolution metadata ǫ1, delayed
pseudonym resolution metadata ǫ2, a symmetric key k encrypted for the
target vehicle v, target data ζ encrypted with key k and a hash of target
vehicle’s v CID concatenated with a salt s. ǫ1 and ǫ2 contain the same pub-
lic pseudonym resolution ID generated by the APRS. The APRS knows the
linkage between pseudonym resolution IDs and public pseudonym resolution
IDs. Though after publishing the fourth message the law enforcement au-
thority knows the mapping also. Salt s is for encrypting all the data except
β1 and ǫ1. s is also important in protecting the CID cid. For efficiency rea-
sons, the same s can be used for all the PFM2 messages with the same order
ID. This is not a security problem since, for each pseudonym resolution, a
fresh public pseudonym resolution ID is generated, which is inside the ǫ2,
which is inside the hash. The delay mechanism is implemented with the
salt s. Optionally, the s can be revealed in the eighth message. The whole
message is signed by the APRS.
APRS result: If the fourth message is published properly, then the
system can proceed to step 6. In the sixth message, the APRS delivers a
response data η to the law enforcement authority. Note that with the η,
the original δ is delivered. The δ contains a pseudonym resolution ID and
therefore the law enforcement authority can know which request is related
to the response.
Optional second public forum message: Optionally, judge can send
an order to reveal all the encrypted data in the fourth message. With the
order, judge sends β3, which contains the same order ID that is in β1 and
β2. Additionally, it can contain something which judge would like to reveal
to keep its accountability under observations of users of the system.
Publishing second public forum message: When the judge sends
the seventh message, then the APRS publishes the eighth message. In the
eighth message, salt s is revealed, and therefore all which were encrypted
with it. β3 is revealed also. A vehicle can find out whether the message
is for it by checking that the h(cid||s) hash in the PFM2 is the same as a
value of h with its checking ID concatenated with the s as the argument.
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Additionally, the vehicle can find out the target data ǫ by decrypting it with
the key k.
The message sequence chart of this interaction is shown in Figure 5.
J LE APRS PF
[α]S
[α, β1, β2, γ, SJ(β1, β2, γ)]
S
[β1, β2, γ, δ, SJ (β1, β2, γ)]
S
(β1, ǫ1, h(β2, ǫ2, Ekv (k), Ek(ζ), h(cid||s)), SAPRS (◦))
Check that the PFM1 is
published properly
[δ, η]S




(β3, ǫ3, β2, ǫ2, Ekv(k), Ek(ζ), h(cid||s), s, SAPRS (◦))
msc Generic pseudonym resolution system
Figure 5: Generic pseudonym resolution system message sequence chart
5.4.3 Variable Specifications and Visibilities
Variable specifications for the variables α, β,. . . can be found from Table 2.
The variables are also for grouping data by visibility for participating enti-
ties or revealing time. Participating entities from a data visibility point of
view are law enforcement authority, judge, APRS, a target vehicle, and all
the other entities. Variable visibilities can be found from Table 3. In the
visibilities-table “pre PFM1” denotes the time before the first public forum
message and “post PFM1” correspondingly the time after the first PFM.
Explanations for “pre PFM2” and “post PFM2” are similar. The value
of (pre PFM1, β3) is gray J. Gray color denotes the uncertainty of judge’s






pseudonym resolution time frame




pseudonym resolution order metadata












pseudonym resolution time frame
pseudonym validity time frame
Js signature over the message
δ LEA
pseudonym resolution ID
pseudonym resolution request arguments
ǫ1 APRS




public pseudonym resolution ID
delayed pseudonym resolution metadata
ǫ3 APRS
public pseudonym resolution ID
delayed additional pseudonym resolution metadata
ζ APRS Target informing data
η APRS pseudonym resolution result
Table 2: Message variable specifications. Lines with bullets are obligatory
sub-items for items above bulleted items.
5.5 More Efficient PFM2 Checking
In Section 5.4.2 the PFM2 message checking functionality for vehicles is
rather inefficient because of the aggregate amount of used resources. In this
section a solution for the resource usage problem is presented.
Bloom filters can be utilised to achieve even more efficient PFM2 check-
ing. Optionally, a Bloom filter with capacity n and probability p can be
published once in n PFM2 messages containing all n h(cid||nseq) hashes for
published PFM2 messages. Within a published Bloom filter, also a public
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Visibility pre PFM 1
post PFM 1
& pre PFM 2
post PFM 2
α LEA, J
β1 J, LEA, APRS all
β2 J, LEA, APRS all
β3 J J, APRS all




ǫ3 APRS APRS all
ζ APRS target
η APRS LEA, J
Table 3: Message variable visibilities
pseudonym resolution ID interval should be published. If the more efficient
PFM2 checking is used, then the generated public pseudonym resolution IDs
should form a rising ordered list. Sequential numbers nseq can be for exam-
ple in the set of two-byte integers {0, . . . , 65535}. The cardinality of the set
determines the interval for publishing a new CID for a vehicle. No value
in the set should be re-used with the same CID. Otherwise, linking values
h(cid||nseq) with the same cid is possible – an adversary can find out that a
vehicle with a cid is resolved at least cardinality of the set times. Therefore
a new fresh CID should be delivered for a vehicle when all of the sequential
numbers are used. Using the set N is not practical from the technical point
of view.
If a vehicle needs to check that is there a PFM2 for it, it should know
its current CID and the corresponding sequential number. The vehicle
starts the checking process by downloading the oldest unchecked Bloom
filter. Then the vehicle checks whether the filter contains the h(cid||nseq) or
not. If it contains it, then the vehicle checks all the PFM1 messages in the
interval. If there is no matching PFM1 for the vehicle, then the match was
a false positive. If there is a match in the interval, then the vehicle should
update its sequential number to the next by increasing the old one by one
(modulo the cardinality of the set) or get a new CID with a corresponding
initial sequential number if there are no sequential numbers left for the CID.
Then the vehicle can continue by downloading a new oldest unchecked filter
and the process starts over.
Counting Bloom filters [19] can be used also. In that case, a vehicle can
know before going through a PFM1 message interval that how many PFM1
messages there are for it. Knowledge of the number of matching PFM1
messages leads to more efficient checking because all the PFM1 messages in
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an interval are not needed to go through in average. Counting Bloom filters
are in general larger in size (bytes) than traditional Bloom filters without
counting features.
5.6 Variables For Different Pseudonym Resolution Requests
In this section, it is presented how the proposed solution can be used for
resolutions listed in Table 1. Resolution types are taken fromOB Table 1.
In Table 4, the column ǫ1 is critical for avoiding leakage of unauthorized
linkage data. Even publishing a number of some items can reveal informa-
tion from which one can infer unauthorized results.
For the third pseudonym resolution request in Table 1 there should be
distinct PFMs with distinct public resolution IDs in the case where the
pseudonyms are not co-linked. Otherwise, the targets could find afterwards
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Table 4: Variables for different pseudonym resolution requests
5.7 Requirements for the PF and the CIDS
Both the public forum and CIDS have the same requirements which are
discussed in this section. Integrity protection of the public forum is impor-
tant, because it is part of the mechanisms of making the judge accountable,
publishing metadata of resolutions, and publishing target data.
Integrity protected: Appended values cannot be altered afterwards.
For efficiency and plausibility reasons the public forum should be ap-
pendable only by the APRS. If other entities were allowed to append, then
searching for a PFM2 for a vehicle could be inefficient. Additionally, an en-
tity could add the same PFMs to the public forum multiple times leading to
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false statistics and the accountable judge being accountable of non existent
resolutions.
Append-only by defined entities: Only defined entities can append val-
ues.
In the fifth step of the generic pseudonym resolution system (Figure 4)
it should be possible to check that a PFM is published.
Proof of publishing: Given a proportion p, it must be possible to check
that a value is appended so that the proportion p of the legitimate par-
ticipants of a related identity management system can read the appended
value.
5.8 Compatible Pseudonym Schemes
A pseudonym scheme is compatible with the proposed solution if:
• for each pseudonym, the corresponding vehicle identity is available
before a query or on demand,
• for each vehicle identity and a time frame, the corresponding pseudonyms
are available before a query or on demand,
• for each vehicle it is possible to encrypt a given message for it by
knowing its identity, and
• each vehicle can sign a given message and the signature can be verified
by knowing the signers identity.
The SCMS is compatible with the solution with small changes. More
details are given in Section 7.4.
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6 Implementation Guidelines
In this section implementation guidelines for the APRS and implementation
options for the public forum are discussed.
6.1 Implementation Guidelines for the APRS
Since in this solution the APRS has all the linkage data, avoiding side chan-
nels in the APRS is among minimum requirements for an implementation.
Avoiding Side Channels
Using the Intel SGX TEE it is possible for example to enforce that the PFM1
is published before a pseudonym resolution result is sent to the requesting
LEA. There are side channel attack against Intel SGX. The authors of [10]
present a cache-based side channel attack against Intel SGX which uses the
so called Prime+Probe cache monitoring technique. The authors present a
full 2048-bit RSA key recovery from an SGX enclave with the attack. An-
other side channel approach is to infer control flow of a program by causing
page faults [44].
An implementation must also take into account possible side channels
caused by database usage. For instance, if a law enforcement authority
sends a pseudonym co-linking request which is approved by a judge, then
later, after the request is handled, no entity, including the law enforcement
authority, should be able to get pseudonym holder-linkage (Definition 1) in-
formation for the pseudonym set without a permission from a judge, using
some information from the pseudonym co-linking handling process. Logi-
cally, a pseudonym resolution system should internally link a pseudonym to
its holder in order to be able to tell that two pseudonyms are co-linked to
each other. That holder-linkage information should not leak. Not even a
row number containing holder information should leak – it is possible that
the row number can be used in getting some linkage information in an unau-
thorized way. The problem with leaking database row numbers is that if an
adversary knows a database row number for a holder, it can later send just
co-linking requests and get holder-linkage data at the same time. Leaking
database row numbers violates perfect forward privacy.
Since pseudonym resolution is not time critical, one possible solution is
to use a carousel [42]. In the carousel approach, database rows are circulated
in the TEE so that there are for example 1000 rows available at the same
time in the TEE. The carousel approach helps the situation but does not fix
it completely [10], [44].
Another approach is to use an oblivious RAM scheme [23].
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6.2 Implementation Options for the Public Forum/CIDS
The both public forum and CIDS can be implemented on the practical level
using a same database.
Issues of publishing public forum messages: The issue of checking
whether a PFM is published is not trivial to solve since the adversary could
spoof that a message is published. In other words, the adversary could
deliver false proof of publishing. Logically, the adversary can surround the
APRS so that it intercepts all the outgoing messages and spoofs all the
ingoing messages to deceive the APRS. A simple, yet effective solution is
that the public forum is a trusted party which sends a confirmation back to
the sender when it receives a message. In that case, the sender can trust
that at least the message was received by the public forum. Additionally,
authorizing vehicles to confirm publishing messages helps in avoiding false
proofs of publishment.
A solution: In the following, a public forum and CIDS implementation
is presented which meets the requirements integrity protected, append-only
by defined entities, and proof of publishing, utilizes confirmation messages
of vehicles and the public forum, and where the public forum is trusted. The
trustworthiness of the public forum can be achieved by using a TEE. When
the public forum receives a message from the APRS, it stores the message,
publishes the message, generates a signature over a hash of the message and
stores the signature. Some vehicles read the published messages. The ve-
hicles sign the hashes of the published messages with their long-term keys
and send the signatures to the public forum. The public forum stores and
publishes the received signatures within the corresponding message from
the APRS. The APRS reads all the signatures for a message from the pub-
lic forum. If there is a valid signature from the public forum and enough
signatures from distinct vehicles, the APRS can conclude that the message
is published properly and continue to the sixth step in Figure 4. The APRS
sends a message to the public forum to inform that the PFM record can be
marked as confirmed. By doing that, vehicles will not do useless work.
The motivation of vehicles: The question is why a proportion of ve-
hicles could be motivated to spent their resources by confirming PFMs. For
example, victims of transportation accidents where a party escapes from the
scene trying to hide its identity could be motivated to spent a small amount
of resources for keeping the system functional. In addition, it is safe to as-
sume that the majority of vehicles do not want to be target of uncontrolled
surveillance. Confirming PFMs supports accountability of the system mit-
igating uncontrolled surveillance. Therefore a proportion of vehicles could
be willing to confirm PFMs.
Meeting requirements: The requirement proof of publishing is met
with the introduced steps and the requirement append-only by defined enti-
ties can met by restricting the public forum to accept only messages signed
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by the APRS. Therefore only the requirement integrity protected remains.
The integrity protection is possible to achieve by putting the hash of the
preceding PFM to each PFM by the APRS. By doing that, a vehicle could
notice if a published PFM is removed or altered afterwards. Anyone can
download all the PFM and check that nothing is altered afterwards.
Another public forum implementation option is for example a blockchain.
34
7 Evaluation
In this evaluation section, an extended adversary model, security evaluation,
and deployability of the service are discussed. In the security evaluation,
meeting solution requirements and resistance against the adversary model
(Sections 3.2 and 7.1) are discussed.
Requirement 1 in Section 4.3 is met by the proposed solution withuout
its authorization part as presented in Table 4. Requirement 3 in Section 4.3
is met by the proposed solution because in the solution a PFM1 contains
variable ǫ1 (Figure 4), which contains pseudonym resolution metadata (Ta-
ble 2), which can contain resolution type as presented in Table 4. Addi-
tionally, the knowledge whether a target is informed about a resolution can
be inferred from the existence of corresponding PFM2 for the PFM1. The
PFM1 is published in any case when pseudonym resolution happens and the
corresponding PFM2 is published if the judge decides to inform the target.
7.1 Extended Adversary Model
In this section, the adversary model (Section 3.2) is extended to cover the
proposed solution. For the sake of simplicity, public forum and CIDS are
called just public forum.
Vehicles
A vehicle could try to read information for some other vehicle from the
public forum. A vehicle could try to alter data in the public forum.
Law Enforcement Authority (LEA)
A law enforcement authority representative could try to steal an order for
some other law enforcement authority representative and use it to request
unauthorized pseudonym resolutions. A law enforcement authority represen-
tative could try to infer some extra information that the law enforcement
authority representative is not authorized to get by reading public data pub-
lished by the APRS. A law enforcement authority representative could try
to use stolen credentials of some other law enforcement authority representa-
tive to ask for permission to resolve from a judge with spoofed justification
data and then use the same credentials to send resolution requests to the
APRS.
Judge
A judge could try to authorize a law enforcement authority representative to
resolve with a fake identity or a stolen identity. In other words, authorizing
some entity without being accountable. A judge could try to convince that
it is not accountable of some resolution permission or resolutions done with
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the permission. A judge could try to alter published PFMs for getting rid
of its accountability.
Public Forum
The public forum could try to spoof proof of publishing. The public forum
could try to alter added values.
Accountable Pseudonym Resolution Service (APRS)
The adversary could try to accept unauthorized resolutions by controlling
the APRS. The adversary could try to avoid publishing PFMs when resolv-
ing by controlling the APRS. The adversary could try to intercept linkage
data import messages by controlling the APRS so that some pseudonyms of
a vehicle are not resolvable.
7.2 Security Evaluation
First, Tamarin prover model and a Tamarin prover security proof are dis-
cussed. The model and the proof are then used in justifying meeting the
requirements and resistance against the adversary model.
7.2.1 Tamarin Prover Model
“The Tamarin Prover is a security protocol verification tool that supports
both falsification and unbounded verification in the symbolic model. Security
protocols are specified as multiset rewriting systems and analysed with respect
to (temporal) first-order properties and a message theory that models Diffie-
Hellman exponentiation combined with a user-defined subterm-convergent
rewriting theory.” [7].
Overview of Tamarin: The central parts of the Tamarin system are
multiset rewriting rules and multiset of facts. The multiset denotes a set
which can hold multiple instances of the same element. All facts are of the
form F(t1,...,tn) where the F part is the symbol of a fact and t1,...,tn
are terms of a fact. All the facts with the same symbol should have the
same arity. The rewriting rules are of the form [] –[]-> [] where each of
the square brackets can contain many facts or no facts at all. For instance
[F1(a,b)] –[F2(b)]-> [F3(a)] is syntactically a correct rule declaration
in Tamarin. A rule can execute if the multiset of facts contains all the facts in
the leftmost square brackets. If there is the exclamation mark before a fact,
like !F(t), it means that the fact is persistent. It means that the fact can be
consumed by a rule without taking the fact away from the multiset. In turn,
if a fact is not persistent, then it is taken away from the multiset when a
rule consumes it. For instance, if the rule [F1(a,b), !F2(a)] –[F3(b)]->
[F4(a)] executes, one fact element F1(a,b) is taken away from the multiset
but none of type !F2(a). If a fact symbol is marked as permanent, it should
be marked permanent everywhere. In the same model, having facts !F(a)
and F(b) is forbidden. Note that different term symbols can be used with
the same fact symbol. If a rule executes, all the facts in the rightmost square
brackets are added in the multiset. All the rewriting rules form a multiset
rewriting system. Further, the multiset rewriting system defines a transition
system. A state in Tamarin is a set of facts in the multiset. A transition is an
execution of a rule. A transition can be labeled by adding one or more facts
to the midmost brackets of the corresponding rule. Facts in the midmost
brackets are called action facts. A trace is a chain of action facts. In other
words, a chain of transitions.
The model: The Tamarin Prover model is in Appendix A. The model is
explained in the following. From now on, all the section references with the
typewriter font are references to the model sections inside Appendix A.
The model is available also on [39].
Communication channels in the model: In the model, a secure
channel is assumed in many protocol steps. A secure channel is modelled in
Section 1.2.1 Secure channel. The channel is authentic and confidential.
Both sides are authenticated. The adversary can delay message delivery, but
eventually messages are delivered. The adversary can also replay messages
an unlimited number of times. The delay mechanism is modeled by putting a
permanent fact !S($A,$B,x) to the multiset of facts by the rule Chan_Out_S
on line 130. In the rule Chan_In_S on line 135, the fact !S($A,$B,x) can
be read immediately, but delays are also possible. The replay is modeled
at the same time. Permanent facts are not removed from the multiset and
therefore the rule Chan_In_S can consume the fact !S($A,$B,x) multiple
times.
Number of participants: The generic resolution system and the un-
derlying identity management system are modeled so that there can be arbi-
trarily many vehicles. For the sake of simplicity, there are only one instances
of the APRS and judge. There two law enforcement authorities. One of
them is malicious and the other can leak information to the malicious law
enforcement authority.
CID delivery: The CID delivery is modeled in Section 1.3 CID delivery.
In the rule APRS_1 on line 144 the APRS sends the message CIDD1 to the
CIDS. That is denoted in the rule by the action fact
APRS_sen_CIDD1_to_CIDS(~cid,pkV_lt). The same convention is used in
all the rules and the convention follows the next template:
participant1_’sen’|’rec’_messageID_’to’|’from’_participant2().
In the template, ’|’ denotes logical OR. More explanations on the convention
are in Section Abbreviations and action fact naming conventions. With
the sent message, a CID for a vehicle is delivered. In the rule CIDS_1 on
line 155 the CIDS receives the CID sent by the APRS. In the rule V_1 on
line 164 the vehicle finds the CID for it and stores it for checking PFMs.
Data import: The data import is modeled in Section 1.4 Data import.
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In the data import, the PIA sends a fresh pseudonym to the APRS. The
secure channel is used.
Overview of the generic resolution model: The generic resolution
system (Figure 4) is modeled in Section 1.5 Generic resolution system.
Note, that the rules in the section are labeled with action facts where the
messageID is of the form GRSi. The abbreviation GRS stands for generic
resolution system and the variable i denotes steps in Figure 4. The model
allows many resolution permission requests from the law enforcement au-
thority. It allows only one response to a resolution permission request (the
adversary can replay messages, but the law enforcement authority receives
the same message only once). The restriction is modeled by putting the
UniqueFact(<’LEA_2’,a,ordID>) action fact to the rule LEA_2 on line 224.
Tamarin restricts itself to consider only the traces where the action fact oc-
curs only once. The name UniqueFact therefore means “unique in a trace”.
The restriction is defined in Section Restrictions.
From an order request to resolution: The law enforcement author-
ity sends a resolution request in the rule LEA_3 on line 233. In the model,
the law enforcement authority sends an pseudonym as a resolution argu-
ment for demonstrating and proving functionality of the model. Including
a pseudonym in the variable δ is modeled by putting the pseudonym inside
less-than and greater-than signs with the variable δ (<~d,~resID,pseu>).
In the model, the law enforcement authority can send multiple resolution
requests with the same resolution order. The model restricts the APRS from
receiving a resolution request multiple times. This restriction is set in the
rule APRS_3 on line 247 as the action fact
UniqueFact(<’APRS_3_ordID_resID’,ordID,resID>). From among the
resolution arguments and the database query results the APRS chooses the
target long-term identity. In the rule APRS_3, the target long-term iden-
tity comes from the fact !APRS_2(pseu,pkV_lt). The APRS must verify
validity of the resolution request. It verifies that the order is signed by a
legitimate judge and that the sender identity is in the order. Comparing the
request to the order is not modeled. If all the checks pass, the APRS sends
a PFM1 to the public forum.
From checking publishment of the PFM1 to sending an reso-
lution result: The public forum receives the PFM1 in the rule PF_1 on
line 273. The public forum check, that the message is from the APRS by
verifying the signature in the message. A PFM should be stored in the pub-
lic forum only once. That restriction is modeled with the action fact
UniqueFact(<’PF_1’,pub_resID>) in the rule PF_1. The APRS checks
that the PFM1 is published properly. That is modeled by demanding the
fact !PF_storage(promise) in the rule APRS_4, which is in the multiset
only if the public forum received the PFM1. The APRS continues by send-
ing the resolution result to the law enforcement authority and a notification
to the judge. In reality the notification is not needed, but the judge knows
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that how long the order can be used to resolve and can decide after the order
validity period whether to order to send PFM2 messages or not. The law
enforcement authority receives a response from the APRS for the resolution
request in the rule LEA_4 on line 299. The law enforcement authority stores
the resolution results. The law enforcement authority also verifies that the
answer really comes from the APRS. This is modeled in the rule LEA_4 with
the action fact Eq(verify(sig,«d,resID>,eta>,pkAPRS),true). The Eq
restriction is presented in Section Restrictions
Judge decides to inform the target: The judge sends an order to
send the PFM2 in the rule J_3 on line 318. The APRS receives the order
in the rule APRS_5 on line 325. Note that when the judge sends an order to
send the PFM2, all the PFM1 messages in the public forum should receive
a corresponding PFM2. It means that the APRS should repeat the step
8 in Figure 4 possibly many times. The repeating is modeled by allowing
receiving the message from the judge in the rule APRS_5 by not restricting
the rule from executing in a trace multiple times with an ordID. Note that
executing the rule multiple times in a trace with the same resID is restricted.
Vehicles searching target data: Vehicles can find target data for
them in the rule V_2 on line 353. Action fact Eq(hash_cid,h2(<cid,s>))
in the rule follows the checking procedure presented in Section 5.4.2: a
vehicle checks whether the hash h(cid||s) (hash_cid) matches with the hash
of the CID of the vehicle and the s (h2(<cid,s>)). Additionally the vehicle
can check that that the PFM2 contains really data which was generated for
the PFM1 by checking that the hash in the PFM1 equals to the hash of
β2, ǫ2, Ekv (k), Ek(ζ), h(cid||s) from the PFM2
(Eq(hash,h1(<b2,e2,enc_k,enc_z,hash_cid>))).
Leaking orders: In Section 1.7 Malicious entities, the model takes
into account the possibility of leaking resolution orders to law enforcement
authorities which are not authorized to resolve with the orders. There are
three spots where an order can leak: the judge, the law enforcement au-
thority, and the APRS. Note that channels between the three are assumed
secure. The law enforcement authority leaks an order in the rule LEA_5 on
line 382. Leaking the order and using it is modeled by leaking the order to
the adversary in the rule LEA_5
(Out(«b1,ordID>,b2,<g,pkLE>,sign(«b1,ordID>,b2,<g,pkLE»,skJ)>)),
leaking the private key of the malicious law enforcement authority to the
adversary in the rule Malicious_LEA_1 on line 392, and letting the adver-
sary to decide what data the malicious law enforcement authority sends to
the APRS in the rule Malicious_LEA_2 on line 398.
Tamarin Prover Security Proof
The security of the solution can be proved with lemmas in Section 2. Lemmas.
The actual proof can be generated by installing the Tamarin Prover [7],
39
downloading the model on [39], and running command tamarin-prover
accountable_pseudonym_resolution_service.spthy --prove. The proof
is also available on [40]. Because the commandline option --heuristic
is not used in generating the proof, the default heuristic, ’smart’, is used.
Details of the heuristic can be found from the Tamarin manual on [7] or
from [37].
The proof is relevant against the adversary model since Tamarin contains
a Dolev-Yao adversary. The adversary controls the network and can delete,
inject, modify and intercept messages on the network. In the model, all facts
of the form Out(message) in the multiset are known by the adversary. For
instance, if the rule [F1(a,b), !F2(a)] –[F3(b)]-> [Out(a)] executes,
the adversary will know all readable contents of the variable a.
In Section 2.1 Sources lemmas the lemmas are for helping the Tamarin
to know where a variable is originated. In other words: where a variable is
fresh. An interested reader can refer to the Tamarin manual available on [7].
With lemmas in Section 2.2 CID delivery, the CID delivery can be
proved to be functional and secure. Functionality lemmas are in Section 2.2.1
Functionality and security lemmas are in Section 2.2.2 Security. The
same sectioning style is used in Section 2.3 Data import and Section 2.4
Generic resolution system.
The main motivations for this section is to show that the proposed design
in Section 5 (Figure 4) maintains variable visibilities presented in Table 3
and that the security lemmas are relevant. Then these variable visibilities,
the variable specifications (Table 2), and the security lemmas can be used
in the following sections.
The most important lemma in Section 2.4 Generic resolution system
is the the_system_is_functional lemma on line 559. The reason for that
is that if the lemma does not pass, then many security lemmas could pass
trivially. For example, if a lemma can be written in natural language “for
all traces where a law enforcement authority representative receives a reso-
lution result, it is true that the corresponding PFM1 is published before the
law enforcement authority receives the result” and there are no traces in the
model where “a law enforcement authority representative receives a resolu-
tion result”, then the lemma is trivially true because there are no traces
which can contradict the latter part “it is true that the corresponding PFM1
is published before the law enforcement authority receives the result” of the
lemma. Because the lemma the_system_is_functional passes, it means
that the model is functioning and that the security lemmas are relevant.
Table 5 shows which lemmas can be used in proving that the model
maintains message variable visibilities presented in Table 3.
Note that lemmas in Table 5 consider message variable visibilities in less
granular way than Table 3. However, the model and lemmas consider the
most important visibility boundary – the adversary visibility boundary.
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Variable Lemmas
α a_is_not_known_by_the_adversary on line 827
β1 b1_is_not_known_by_the_adversary_before_a_PFM_1 on line 847
β2 b2_is_not_known_by_the_adversary_before_PFM_2 on line 876
β3 b3_is_not_known_by_the_adversary_before_PFM_2 on line 900
γ g_is_not_known_by_the_adversary on line 922
δ d_is_not_known_by_the_adversary on line 942
ǫ1
Not relevant since ǫ1 is generated
in the APRS just before sending it to the public forum.
ǫ2 e2_is_not_known_by_the_adversary_before_PFM_2 on line 969
ǫ3
Not relevant since ǫ3 is generated
in the APRS just before sending it to the public forum.
ζ z_is_not_known_by_the_adversary on line 995
η eta_is_not_known_by_the_adversary on line 1009
Table 5: Message variable visibility lemmas
Evaluating Requirement 1 (Authorised Pseudonym Resolution)
With lemma only_authorized_LEA_can_resolve on line 1067 it can be
proved that the model and therefore the design allows only authorized
pseudonym resolution.
The lemma only_authorized_LEA_can_resolve can be written in nat-
ural language as “whenever a LEA receives a resolution result and no reso-
lution requests have been leaked, the judge authorized the resolution and the
LEA used the authorization to resolve”. The actual proof for the lemma can
be found from [40]. In Tamarin, proving the lemma
only_authorized_LEA_can_resolve takes 19 steps.
The lemma demands that whenever the action fact
LEA_rec_GRS6_from_APRS(<d,resID,pseu>,<eta,pkV_lt>) occurs in a trace,
in the same trace should occur also action facts
J_sen_GRS2_to_LEA(a,<b1,ordID>,b2,<g,pkLEA>,sig)
and LEA_sen_GRS3_to_APRS(<b1,ordID>,b2,<g,pkLEA>,<d,resID,pseu>,sig,sig_3).
Because there are the same variable ordID in the two action facts, these ac-




so these facts are also bound together. Therefore facts
LEA_rec_GRS6_from_APRS(<d,resID,pseu>,<eta,pkV_lt>)
and J_sen_GRS2_to_LEA(a,<b1,ordID>,b2,<g,pkLEA>,sig) are bound to-
gether. That means that in the model, for all traces, if a resolution happens
the judge authorized it by sending an order.
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Evaluating Requirement 2 (Target Informing and Pseudonym Res-
olution Justification Data)
Meeting Requirement 2 in Section 4.3 is discussed in this section.
In the proposed solution, pseudonym resolution can happen only with
a valid order from a judge. With the order, the judge delivers justification
data inside variable β1 (Figure 4 and Table 2). The justification data can-
not be altered, because the judge signs variables β1, β2, and γ. The APRS
checks the signature before it approves a resolution request or the justifica-
tion data. The APRS is enforced to publish the justification data before it
sends a resolution result to a requester law enforcement authority represen-
tative. Therefore the pseudonym resolution justification data is published if
pseudonym resolution happens and the data is from an accountable judge.
With lemma res_leads_to_publishing_a_PFM1 on line 759 it can be
proved that the model enforces publishing a corresponding PFM1 when
resolution happens.
The lemma res_leads_to_publishing_a_PFM1 can be written in nat-
ural language as “whenever the LEA receives a resolution result, the corre-
sponding PFM1 was published”. Proving the lemma takes 13 steps.
The lemma demands that whenever the action fact
PF_rec_GRS4_from_APRS(<b1,ordID>,<e1,pub_resID>) occurs in a trace,
in the same trace should occur also action fact
PF_rec_GRS4_from_APRS(<b1,ordID>,<e1,pub_resID>) and that the lat-
ter fact occurs before the former fact. These two facts are bound together via
variables resID, pub_resID, and ordID. That means that in the model, for
all traces, if resolution happens, then a corresponding PFM1 was published.
A judge can send an informing order to the APRS. The order consists
of variable β3, which contains for example order ID (Table 2). The APRS
is enforced to publish the corresponding (to the order ID) PFM2. The
PFM2 contains delayed justification data from the judge inside variable β2.
Therefore delayed pseudonym resolution justification data is published if the
judge decides so.
Note that it cannot proved for all traces that when the judge sends an
order to publish it leads to publishing the corresponding PFM2. The reason
is that in a trace, the adversary can intercept all the messages from the
judge. Lemma
Js_order_to_send_PFM2_messages_leads_to_publishing_a_correct_PFM2
on line 628 shows that it is possible in the model that an order leads to pub-
lishing a PFM2.
The remaining part is to show that only the target can know that its
pseudonym has been under resolution. In the proposed solution, target data
is published inside variable ζ in a way that only the target can read it. The
target data is encrypted with a symmetric key. The symmetric key is en-
crypted with the long-term key of the target vehicle. Security of target data
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variable ζ can be proved with lemma z_is_not_known_by_the_adversary
on line 995 in the model.
Lemma z_is_not_known_by_the_adversary can be written in natural
language as “whenever the APRS publishes a PFM2 it should not be that
the adversary knows the target data zeta. The lemma makes sure that the
adversary cannot know target data.
Lemma a_vehicle_can_read_target_data_published_for_it on line 740
can be used to prove that a target can find target data for it.
Evaluating Requirement 3 (Statistical Pseudonym Resolution In-
formation)
With lemma res_leads_to_publishing_a_PFM1 on line 759 it can be proved
that whenever a resolution happens, statistical data of it is published. The
lemma was discussed in the previous section.
The requirement is fulfilled because in the design PFM1 messages con-
tain data for composing the statistical data of resolution types mentioned in
the requirement. Additionally, statistical information of pseudonym resolu-
tions which have been informed can be composed by checking which PFM1
messages have corresponding PFM2 messages.
Countermeasures Against the Adversary Model
Vehicles
The attack discussed in Section 3.2 where the adversary controls a vehicle
and the APRS is unfeasible if there are no available side channels in the
APRS. The APRS has a TEE component and in the proposed solution the
TEE component enforces that resolution is possible only with a legitimate
order from a legitimate judge. Vehicles can notice if the TEE component is
faulty by requesting remote attestation from it. However, in the attack, the
adversary does not need to make the TEE faulty. It could be sufficient for
the adversary to monitor side channels as discussed in Section 6.1. Therefore
avoiding side channels in the APRS is sufficient for avoiding the attack.
The attack discussed in Section 3.2 where the adversary could try to send
a false ID data from a controlled vehicle to the APRS is not feasible because
a vehicle signs its ID before sending it and leakage of private keys is unlikely
if on-board units are equipped with a trusted platform module or a TEE
(terms hardware security module [29] and trusted component [30] are used
also). If a vehicle sends a correctly signed false identity, it will be caught.
Signatures are made with private keys and it is assumed that the APRS
knows all the legitimate participants of the related identity management
system.
The attack discussed in Section 3.2 where the adversary could try to
alter data in the pseudonym resolution service by commanding a controlled
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vehicle can be mitigated by careful input sanitation if the vehicle can send
data to the APRS. The only advantage for the adversary of controlling a
vehicle in this case is that it achieves a wider available attack surface.
The attack discussed in Section 7.1 where a vehicle could try to read
information for some other vehicle is not possible in the proposed solution
and this can be proved with lemma z_is_not_known_by_the_adversary
on line 995 in the model.
The attack discussed in Section 7.1 where a vehicle could try to alter
data in the public forum is not feasible in the proposed solution because
the data can be copied to many locations and its integrity can be checked
afterwards (requirement integrity protected in Section 5.7 and discussion in
Section 6.2)
Pseudonym Issuing Authority (PIA)
The attack discussed in Section 3.2 where a controlled PIA tries to send false
linkage data to the APRS is a real threat against the proposed solution. One
possible solution could be to enforce vehicles to send their pseudonyms after
issuance to the APRS encrypted for the APRS and signed with long-term
keys. If the APRS does not receive matching pseudonym data from the
PIA and the vehicle, it can conclude that either the PIA or the vehicle is
malicious. It is assumed that the vehicle does not have access to a private
key belonging to some other vehicle. The problem is that the PIA and the
vehicle can decide not to send any messages to the APRS at all. They will
be caught in that case if a non-imported pseudonym is received afterwards
by the APRS in a resolution request.
The attack where a controlled PIA does not send any linkage data of
some issued pseudonyms to the APRS could be prevented similarly as the
previous attack.
The attack where a controlled PIA sends linkage data to the adversary
is more likely an issue of a related identity management system.
Law Enforcement Authority (LEA)
The attack discussed in Section 3.2 where a controlled law enforcement au-
thority representative ties to do unauthorized pseudonym resolution by steal-
ing credentials from an authorized law enforcement authority representative
is possible in the solution. A possible solution for the problem is that autho-
rized law enforcement authorities keep track of published PFM1 messages.
If a law enforcement authority representative notices a PFM1 message in
the public forum with an order ID which belongs to an order belonging to
the representative and if the representative was not the one requesting res-
olution related to the PFM1, then the representative can conclude that its
credentials are stolen.
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The attack where a controlled LEA representative tries to get unau-
thorized pseudonym resolution data from the pseudonym resolution service
without stolen credentials is not possible without side channels or severe
vulnerabilities in an APRS implementation. An order contains an autho-
rized LEA representative ID and the ID is signed by the authorizing judge.
The APRS checks the signature and compares the LEA representative ID
in the order to the requesting LEA representative ID. This can be proved
with lemma stolen_orders_cannot_be_used_for_res on line 807 in the
model.
The attack where a controlled LEA representative tries to alter data in
the APRS by attacking against the APRS is not possible without severe
vulnerabilities in an APRS implementation.
The attack discussed in Section 7.1 where an LEA representative tries
to infer some extra information from the PF can be prevented by choosing
carefully all the pseudonym resolution metadata (for example column ǫ1 in
Table 4).
The attack where a law enforcement authority representative tries to use
stolen credentials of some other law enforcement authority representative to
ask for permission to resolve from a judge with spoofed justification data
and then use the same credentials to send resolution requests to the APRS
is possible in the proposed solution if the judge does not notice that the
requester is using stolen credentials. The problem can be solved by includ-
ing a hash h(order ID||LEA ID) into variable β1 into pseudonym resolution
order metadata (Table 2). By adding the hash into pseudonym resolution
order metadata the holder of the credentials can notice if its credentials are
misused.
Judge
The attack in Section 7.1 where a judge tries to authorize a law enforcement
authority representative to resolve with a fake identity or a stolen identity
can be prevented. Authorization with a fake identity does not work, because
the APRS checks the signature from the judge. If an order made with stolen
credentials is used, the ID of the accountable judge is added to variable ǫ1
(Table 2). The accountable judge can then notice, that its credentials are
used for making the order.
The case where a judge tries to convince that it is not accountable of
some resolution permission or resolutions done with the permission can be
handled by using a policy where a holder of credentials is accountable no
matter who uses the credentials. As discussed before, a judge can notice if
its credentials are misused. Misused credentials should be revoked as soon
as possible.
The attack where a judge tries to alter published PFMs for getting rid of
its accountability is not feasible in the proposed solution because the data
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can be copied to many locations and its integrity can be checked afterwards
(requirement integrity protected in Section 5.7 and discussion in Section 6.2).
Public Forum
The attack where the public forum tries to spoof proof of publishing is not
feasible if the public forum implementation option in Section 6.2 is used.
The implementation option enforces that at least a proportion of vehicles
can read a message.
The attack where the public forum tries to alter added values is not
possible, because the public forum has the requirement integrity protected
and the requirement can be met as discussed in Section 6.2.
Accountable Pseudonym Resolution Service (APRS)
The attack discussed in Section 7.1 where the adversary tries to accept unau-
thorized resolutions by controlling the APRS is not feasible, because there
is a TEE-component in the APRS. Allowing only authorized resolutions is
enforced with the TEE-component. The TEE-component can be asked to
attest that it is correct.
The attack where the adversary tries to avoid publishing PFMs when
resolving by controlling the APRS is not feasible because publishing PFMs
is enforced with the TEE-component.
The attack where the adversary tries to intercept linkage data import
messages by controlling the APRS so that some pseudonyms of a vehicle are
not resolvable is not feasible since the channel between the sender and the
receiver is assumed to be secure. The sender of data import messages must
receive a confirmation from the TEE-component that the data was received.
7.3 How vehicles and Judges Can Trust the System
The system must be trustworthy for vehicles and judges. Vehicles do not
want to participate a system which leaks their personal information in an
uncontrolled way. Judges do not want seem to be accountable for actions
which they have not allowed. A vehicle can request the APRS for remote
attesting its TEE-component. The TEE in the APRS is the root of trust
for vehicles, because it enforces pseudonym resolution to be accountable. As
discussed in the previous section, a judge can trust the system as long as it
keeps its credentials safe.
7.4 Integration to SCMS and PUCA
In this section integration to the two schemes is discussed.
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SCMS
Resolution should be enabled as explained in Section 2.2.6 in Section Pseudonym
Resolution. In the pseudonym issuance, issued pseudonyms should be stored
somewhere. Then these stored pseudonyms should be resolved after the
pseudonym issuance process and sent to the APRS with corresponding link-
age data.
PUCA
In PUCA the Pseudonym Certificate Authority (PCA) knows all the pseudonyms
but it cannot link these pseudonyms to any long-term identities. Integrating
PUCA to the proposed solution is possible in the following way. When the
PCA signs pseudonyms to a vehicle it sends these pseudonyms to the APRS.
Then the vehicle sends its long-term identity with the issued pseudonyms to
the APRS. If the vehicle does not do that, then the APRS can send a mis-
behaviour report to the Registration Authority (RA) and the pseudonyms
will be revoked. The APRS can wait for the message from the vehicle for
example for 1 hour.
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8 Related work
The closest related work is the Conditional Pseudonym Resolution Algo-
rithm In VANETs (CoPRA) [8]. Other related work include Secure re-
vocable anonymous authenticated inter-vehicle communication [20] and V-
Tokens for Conditional Pseudonymity in VANETs [35]. The CoPRA will be
discussed first and then briefly the other two.
8.1 Conditional Pseudonym Resolution Algorithm in VANETs
CoPRA is a proposal for a generic pseudonym resolution protocol in vehic-
ular ad hoc networks which can be integrated into a PKI. In sections 2.2.6
and 2.2.7 V2X pseudonym schemes were discussed. CoPRA is a conditional
pseudonym resolution algorithm for such a system.
The participating entities: The participating entities in CoPRA are
entities from a PKI designed for securing V2X communication [9], such as
the root certificate authority, Long Term Certificate Authority (LTCA) and
Pseudonym Certificate Authority (PCA). Additionally, there is a Data Pro-
tection Agency (DPA) (there can be many of them), which is an optional
entity for checking that an authority is authorized to resolve pseudonyms.
Authorization information is saved to a certificate issued by a root certificate
authority for an authorized authority. For instance, information that an au-
thority is allowed to do pseudonym holder-linkage resolution or pseudonym
co-linkage resolution is saved. Additionally, an authority can have validity
a time for resolution authorization.
Pseudonym issuance: In pseudonym issuance, when a PCA receives
a pseudonym certificate request containing a vehicle’s long-term identity
encrypted for the LTCA and a public key to be certified, the PCA generates
a resolution ID RIdPCV by concatenating a hash of the public key and a
fresh random number. After generating the identifier, the PCA sends to the
LTCA a message containing the encrypted long-term identity, the vehicle’s
signature over the request, a hash of the request and the RIdPCV . After
receiving the message, the LTCA stores the RIdPCV with the long-term
identity and ID of the PCA. Then the LTCA sends a hash of the request,
expiration information of the pseudonym being issued and signature over
the message back to the PCA. After receiving the message, the PCA stores
the identifier of the pseudonym being issued, the resolution ID RIdPCV
and identity of the LTCA. Finally the PCA sends the signed pseudonymous
certificate back to the vehicle. In the issuance process, both the LTCA and
PCA stored escrow data for conditional pseudonym resolution.
The pseudonym resolution process: Assume that an authorized
authority has a report message from an entity, which is a justification for
the resolution. Additionally assume that there is only one pseudonym under
resolution and that the authority wants to get holder-linkage (definition 1)
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data for the pseudonym. The pseudonym resolution process starts from
a point, where a requesting authority sends a resolution request to a DPA
with the justification message, a pseudonym, resolution type and a signature
over the message (certificate containing authorization data is also sent). The
DPA checks that the authority is authorized to proceed with the resolution
by checking and verifying the certificate delivered by the authority. If the
DPA approves the request, then it sends hash δ of the justification message
and pseudonym, current time, resolution types, and signature over the whole
message. In the next protocol step, the authority sends the justification
message, the pseudonym, the response from the DPA resDPA, resolution
types, and signature over the whole message. When the PCA receives the
message, it first checks that a DPA approved the resolution. Then it encrypts
the resolution ID RIdPCV for the pseudonym, the hash δ from the DPA
and current time for the LTCA. The PCA saved the resolution ID during
pseudonym issuance. The PCA sends back to the authority the encrypted
data, the same hash δ which was encrypted, resolution types, the response
from the DPA resDPA and signature over the whole message. When the
authority receives the response from the PCA, it just forwards the message
to the LTCA. The LTCA checks all the signatures and certificates from the
authority, the DPA and the PCA. If all checks pass, then the LTCA sends
back the hash δ, target vehicles long-term ID, expiry date of the long-term
ID (the long-term ID for a vehicle can be changed periodically) and signature
over the whole message.
Accountability in CoPRA: In this scheme, DPA is made accountable
since it approves all the pseudonym resolution requests. Non authorized
pseudonym resolution is restricted by organizational separation. However,
if the PCA and the LTCA collude, they can resolve pseudonyms without lim-
its. Malicious collusion of the DPA is not needed for malicious pseudonym
resolution. Therefore the DPA is not fully accountable. In the conclusion
section, the authors of the CoPRA-paper denote that CoPRA could be hard-
ened using a TEE.
Integrating CoPRA to SCMS: CoPRA can be integrated to SCMS
if the RASCMS is allowed to send an long-term identity of a vehicle to a re-
quester, as discussed in the pseudonym resolution paragraph in Section 2.2.6.
The authorized authority can be the misbehaviour authority in SCMS. The
DPA can be the PCASCMS, because the PCASCMS has the linkage informa-
tion of the RA-to-PCA hash to a pseudonymous certificate. The RASCMS
should approve a request from the misbehaviour authority in SCMS only if
the request is approved by the PCASCMS.
49
8.2 Secure revocable anonymous authenticated inter-vehicle
communication
Secure revocable anonymous authenticated inter-vehicle communication is
a pseudonym scheme with pseudonym resolution capabilities. Pseudonym
resolution is possible by co-operation of preset number of authorities and
co-operation is enforced by using cryptographic methods.
Authors developed the scheme focusing on reducing the danger of misuse
by a single compromised authority and enforcing the many-eye principle for
resolving identities. Authors also set a broad requirement for their scheme
which states that by using their scheme no more personal information should
be possible to infer than without using their scheme. They use pseudonyms
to achieve unlinkability. They use magic-ink signatures to achieve the ob-
jective of many-eye identity resolution.
For each vehicle using the scheme there is a tag. The system knows
the linkage between vehicles and tags. In identity resolution a tag can be
resolved and therefore the corresponding vehicle. To resolve the tag, preset
number of authorities should co-operate. The many-eye principle is met in
that way.
There is no accountable authorities for a pseudonym resolution in the
scheme. If all the authorities needed for resolution collude, users of the
system will not know about that. Being not accountable is a difference to
the design presented in this thesis. In the scheme, linkage data is not stored
in a single place. Linkage data between tags and vehicles is, but leaking tags
is not sufficient to link pseudonyms to long term identities. In the presented
design, linkage data is stored possibly in one place.
The scheme does not consider the granularity of pseudonym resolution.
No statistical information is available of pseudonym resolutions.
8.3 V-Tokens for Conditional Pseudonymity in VANETs
V-Tokens for Conditional Pseudonymity in VANETs is a solution for miti-
gating the risk of storing linkage data to a same place. By using V-Tokens,
resolution information is stored into pseudonyms. Resolution information
can be used only by many authorized co-operating authorities.
A V-token is in practice encrypted data produced with a secret-sharing
scheme. A token is encrypted with a public key of resolution authorities.
To decrypt the key, a minimum proportion of resolution authorities should
co-operate.
There is no accountable authorities for a pseudonym resolution in this
protocol either. The scheme is not accountable. Being not accountable is a
difference to the design presented in this thesis. In this scheme, linkage data
is not stored in a same place. That is a difference to the design presented
in this thesis.
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This scheme does not consider the granularity of pseudonym resolution
either. And no statistical information is available of pseudonym resolutions.
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9 Conclusion
The answer to the main research question “How can we achieve accountable
pseudonym resolution in V2X communication systems?” follows.
Accountable resolution can be achieved by making some entity account-
able of resolution. In the proposed solution the accountable entity is judge.
In the solution, judges authorize resolutions by giving resolution orders.
Pseudonym resolution is possible only with a legitimate order. If an or-
der is used, metadata of the usage is published to the public forum. In
the solution the public forum is responsible for making all the published
messages available to everyone. Therefore judges are made accountable by
publishing metadata of resolutions which are authorized by the judges.
As discussed in Section 7.2, to achieve accountable resolution the system
must be secure. Otherwise, pseudonym resolution is possible without an or-
der from an accountable judge. The most critical part of the system from
the security point of view is the APRS and its TEE-component. Linkage
data should be imported to the APRS in a secure way and linkage data
should be stored by the APRS in a secure way. If data import and data
storage are secure, linkage data cannot be read in an unauthorized way.
The TEE-component can be used in secure import (encrypt for the compo-
nent) and in secure storage (sealing by the component). As discussed in
Section 6.1, there must not be side channels available in the APRS. The
APRS must be implemented in a way it tolerates intrusions without leaking
linkage data and losing accountability of the system. The TEE-component
is an important part of the intrusion tolerance.
The mechanism for making judges accountable in the proposed solution
is to enforce publishing messages to the public forum by the APRS when
a resolution happens. The public forum is a central component of the ac-
countability mechanism. It is possible to make sure that a proportion of all
the vehicles can read a published message, as explained in Section 6.2.
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A Tamarin Prover Model
Listing 1: Tamarin prover model






7 ∗ Accountable Pseudonym Reso lu t i on Ser v i c e
8 ∗




13 ∗ Author : Aku S i l venno inen
14 ∗




19 f unc t i on s : h1/1 , h2/1
20 b u i l t i n s : asymmetric−encrypt ion , s i gn ing , symmetric−encrypt ion
21
22 /∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
23 ∗ Re s t r i c t i o n s
24 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
25
26 r e s t r i c t i o n Unique :
27 "
28 Al l x #i #j . UniqueFact ( x ) @ #i & UniqueFact (x ) @ #j ==> #i = #j
29 "
30
31 r e s t r i c t i o n Equal i ty :
32 "








41 S −> Secure channel
42
43 PFM1 −> Fi r s t pub l i c forum message
44 PFM2 −> Second pub l i c forum message
45
46 Action f a c t s denot ing r e c e i v i n g or sending messages are named f o l l ow i ng the next
→֒ convent ion :
47 pa r t i c i pan t1_ ’ sen ’ | ’ rec ’_messageID_’ to ’ | ’ from ’_pa r t i c i pan t2 ( )
48
49 sen −> sends
50 rec −> r ec e i v e s
51
52 DI −> Data import
53 GRS −> Generic r e s o l u t i o n system
54
55 a −> alpha
56 b −> beta
57 g −> gamma
58 d −> de l ta
59 e −> eps i l o n
60 z −> zeta
61 eta −> eta
62
63 s i g −> s igna tu re
64 r e s −> re so l u t i o n
65
66 ord −> order





72 ∗ 1 . Rules
73 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
74 /∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗




78 // Each pub key can be read by the adversary
79 ru l e Get_pk :
80 [ ! Pk(A, pubkey ) ]
81 −−[ Adversary_knows_pub_key ( pubkey) ]−>
82 [ Out( pubkey ) ]
83
84 ru l e Get_pkV :
85 [ !PkV(A, pubkey) ]
86 −−[ Adversary_knows_pub_key ( pubkey) ]−>
87 [ Out( pubkey ) ]
88
89 ru l e Reg i s t e r_pk_V_l t :
90 [ Fr (~ l t k ) ]
91 −−>
92 [ ! LtkV($V , ~ l t k ) , !PkV($V , pk (~ l t k ) ) ]
93
94 // Judge
95 ru l e Reg i s t e r_pk_J :
96 [ Fr (~ l t k ) ]
97 −−[ Reg i s t e r_sk_J (~ l t k )
98 , UniqueFact ( ’ r e g i s t e r_pk_J ’ )
99 ]−>
100 [ ! Ltk ( ’ J ’ , ~ l t k ) , ! Pk( ’ J ’ , pk (~ l t k ) ) ]
101
102 // APRS
103 ru l e Reg i s t e r_pk_APRS:
104 [ Fr (~ l t k ) ]
105 −−[ UniqueFact ( ’ r e g i s t e r_pk_APRS’ ) ]−>
106 [ ! Ltk ( ’APRS’ , ~ l t k ) , ! Pk( ’APRS’ , pk (~ l t k ) ) ]
107
108 // LEA_1
109 ru l e Reg i s t e r_pk_LEA:
110 [ Fr (~ l t k ) ]
111 −−[ Reg i s t e r_sk_LEA(~ l t k )
112 , Reg i s t e r_pk_LEA(pk (~ l t k ) )
113 , UniqueFact ( ’ r e g i s t e r_pk_LEA’ )
114 ]−>
115 [ ! Ltk ( ’LEA’ , ~ l t k ) , ! Pk( ’LEA’ , pk (~ l t k ) ) ]
116
117 // Mal i c i ou s LEA
118 ru l e Reg i s t e r_pk_mal i c i ou s_LEA:
119 [ Fr (~ l t k ) ]
120 −−[ UniqueFact ( ’ r e g i s t e r_pk_mal i c i ou s_LEA’ ) ]−>
121 [ ! Ltk ( ’MLEA’ , ~ l t k ) , ! Pk( ’MLEA’ , pk (~ l t k ) ) ]
122
123 /∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
124 ∗ 1 . 2 Channel r u l e s
125 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
126 /∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
127 ∗ 1 . 2 . 1 Secure channel
128 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
129
130 ru l e Chan_Out_S :
131 [ Out_S($A , $B , x) ]
132 −−[ Chan_Out_S($A , $B , x ) ]−>
133 [ ! S($A , $B , x ) ]
134
135 ru l e Chan_In_S :
136 [ ! S($A , $B , x ) ]
137 −−[ Chan_In_S($A , $B , x) ]−>
138 [ In_S($A , $B , x ) ]
139
140 /∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
141 ∗ 1 . 3 CID de l i v e r y
142 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
143
144 ru l e APRS_1:
145 [ Fr (~ c i d )
146 , !PkV($V , pkV_l t )
147 ]
148 −−[ APRS_sen_CIDD1_to_CIDS(~ cid , pkV_l t )
149 , UniqueFact (<’APRS_5 ’ ,pkV_l t >) // generate only one c id f o r a v e h i c l e
150 ]−>
151 [ Out_S ( ’APRS’ , ’ CIDS’ ,<h1 (pkV_l t ) , aenc (~ cid , pkV_l t )>)
152 , !APRS_1(~ cid , pkV_l t ) // aprs s t o r e s the c i d and the pub l i c key f o r l a t e r use
153 ]
154
155 ru l e CIDS_1:
156 [ In_S ( ’APRS’ , ’CIDS’ ,< idhash , enc_cid >) ]
157 −−[ CIDS_rec_CIDD1_from_APRS( idhash , enc_c id )
158 , UniqueFact (<’APRS_5 ’ , idhash , enc_cid >) // s to r e a c i d only once
159 ]−>
160 [ ! CIDS( idhash , enc_c id )




164 ru l e V_1 :
165 [ ! LtkV($V , skV_l t )
166 , ! CIDS( idhash , enc_c id )
167 ]
168 −−[ Veh i c l e_f i n d s_c id_and_s t o r e s_i t ( adec ( enc_cid , skV_l t ) , pk ( skV_l t ) )
169 , Eq( idhash , h1 (pk ( skV_l t ) ) )
170 , UniqueFact (<’V_1 ’ , skV_l t >) // no need to s to r e a c i d twice
171 ]−>
172 [ !V_1(pk ( skV_l t ) , adec ( enc_cid , skV_l t ) ) ]
173
174 /∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
175 ∗ 1 . 4 Data import
176 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
177
178 ru l e PIA_1 :
179 [ Fr (~ pseu ) // generat e speudonym
180 , !PkV($V , pkV_l t ) // lookup pub−key o f V
181 ]
182 −−[ PIA_sen_DI_to_APRS(~ pseu , pkV_l t ) ]−>
183 [ Out_S ( ’PIA ’ , ’APRS’ ,<~ pseu , pkV_l t , ’ DI ’>)
184 , !LEA(~ pseu ) // LEA acqu i r i ng the pseudonym
185 ]
186
187 ru l e APRS_2:
188 [ In_S ( ’PIA ’ , ’APRS’ ,<pseu , pkV_l t , ’ DI ’>) ]
189 −−[ APRS_rec_DI_from_PIA( pseu , pkV_l t ) ]−>
190 [ !APRS_2( pseu , pkV_l t ) ]
191
192 /∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
193 ∗ 1 . 5 Generic r e s o l u t i o n system
194 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
195
196 ru l e LEA_1 :
197 [ Fr (~ a ) // va r i ab l e f o r r e s o l u t i o n permi s s i on reques t
198 , ! Pk( ’LEA’ , pkLEA1) // lookup pub−key o f LEA
199 ]
200 −−[ LEA_sen_GRS1_to_J (~ a )
201 ]−>
202 [ Out_S ( ’LEA’ , ’ J ’ , <~a , pkLEA1, ’GRS1’>)
203 , !LEA_1(~ a )
204 ]
205
206 // g conta in s LEA ID . That i s modeled by d e l i v e r i n g LEAs pub key with g . J s i gn s the
→֒ pub key a l s o .
207 ru l e J_1 :
208 l e t s i g=s i gn (<<~b1 , ~ ordID>,~b2 ,<~g , pkLEA>>,skJ )
209 in
210 [ In_S ( ’LEA’ , ’ J ’ ,<a , pkLEA, ’GRS1’>)
211 , ! Ltk ( ’ J ’ , skJ ) // lookup pr i v a te key o f J
212 , Fr (~ b1 ) // va r i ab l e f o r r e s o l u t i o n order meta data
213 , Fr (~ ordID ) // f r e sh order ID ( same f o r b1 , b2 and b3 )
214 , Fr (~ b2 ) // va r i ab l e f o r delayed r e s o l u t i on order meta data
215 , Fr (~ g ) // va r i ab l e f o r r e s o l u t i o n order
216 ]
217 −−[ J_rec_GRS1_from_LEA(a ,pkLEA)
218 , J_sen_GRS2_to_LEA(a,<~b1 , ~ ordID>,~b2 ,<~g ,pkLEA>, s i g )
219 ]−>
220 [ Out_S ( ’ J ’ , ’LEA’ ,<a,<~b1 , ~ ordID>,~b2 ,<~g ,pkLEA>,sig , ’GRS2’>)
221 , ! J_1(~ ordID )
222 ]
223
224 ru l e LEA_2 :
225 [ In_S ( ’ J ’ , ’LEA’ ,<a,<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g , pkLEA>, sig , ’GRS2’>)
226 , !LEA_1( a )
227 ]
228 −−[ LEA_rec_GRS2_from_J(a,<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g ,pkLEA>, s i g )
229 , UniqueFact (<’LEA_2 ’ , a , ordID>)
230 ]−>
231 [ !LEA_2_order(<<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g , pkLEA>, sig >) ]
232
233 ru l e LEA_3 :
234 [ !LEA_2_order(<<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g , pkLEA>, sig >)
235 , Fr (~ d) // va r i a b l e f o r r e s o l u t i on reques t
236 , Fr (~ resID ) // d conta in s r e s o l u t i on ID
237 , ! Ltk ( ’LEA’ , skLEA) // lookup pr iv a te key o f LEA
238 , !LEA( pseu ) // d conta in s a pseudonym as an argument
239 ]
240 −−[ LEA_sen_GRS3_to_APRS(<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g ,pkLEA>,<~d , ~ resID , pseu>, s ig , s i gn (pk (skLEA) ,
→֒ skLEA) ) ]−>
241 [ Out_S ( ’LEA’ , ’APRS’,<<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g ,pkLEA>,<~d , ~ resID , pseu>, s ig , s i gn (pk (skLEA) ,
→֒ skLEA) , ’GRS3’>)
242 , LEA_3(<~d , ~ resID>)
60
243 , !LEA_3_r es_reques t(<<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g ,pkLEA>,<~d , ~ resID , pseu>, s ig , s i gn (pk (skLEA) ,
→֒ skLEA) , ’GRS3’>)
244 ]
245
246 // Protocol proceeds only i f Js s i g i s c o r r e c t and i f the sender i s au thor i zed to
→֒ r e s o l v e .
247 ru l e APRS_3:
248 l e t s i g_2=s i gn(<<b1 , ordID>,<~e1 , ~ pub_resID>,h1(<b2 , ~ e2 , aenc (~ k , pkV_l t ) , senc (~ z , ~ k ) ,
→֒ h2(<cid , ~ s>)>) , ’GRS4’> ,skAPRS)
249 PFM1=<<<b1 , ordID>,<~e1 , ~ pub_resID>,h1(<b2 , ~ e2 , aenc (~k ,pkV_l t ) , senc (~ z , ~ k ) , h2(<
→֒ cid , ~ s>)>) , ’GRS4’> , s i g_2>
250 in
251 [ In_S ( ’LEA’ , ’APRS’,<<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g ,pkLEA_2>,<d , resID , pseu>, s i g_1 , s i g_3 , ’GRS3’>)
252 , ! Ltk ( ’APRS’ , skAPRS) // lookup pr ivate−key o f APRS
253 , ! Pk( ’ J ’ , pkJ ) // lookup pub−key o f J
254 , !APRS_2( pseu , pkV_l t ) // lookup iden t i ty−pseudonym pai r o f a v eh i c l e
255 , !APRS_1( cid , pkV_l t ) // lookup CID
256 , Fr (~ k ) // symmetric key f o r the PFM1
257 , Fr (~ s ) // s a l t f o r ob fu scat i ng the hash
258 , Fr (~ e1 ) // va r i a b l e f o r r e s o l u t i on meta data
259 , Fr (~ e2 ) // va r i a b l e f o r delayed r e s o l u t i o n meta data
260 , Fr (~ z ) // va r i a b l e f o r ta rg e t in forming data
261 , Fr (~ pub_resID ) // r e s o l u t i o n id f o r APRS f o r keep ing track o f r e l a t i o n s o f
→֒ PFM1s and r e s o lu t i on r eques t s
262 ]
263 −−[ APRS_rec_GRS3_from_LEA(<<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g ,pkLEA_2>,<d , resID , pseu>, s i g_1 , s i g_3 , ’GRS3
→֒ ’>)
264 , APRS_sen_GRS4_to_PF(<<b1 , ordID>,<~e1 , ~ pub_resID>,<b2 , ~ e2 , ~ k , pkV_l t , ~ z , ~ k , cid , ~ s>>,
→֒ s i g_2)
265 , Eq( v e r i f y ( s i g_1,<<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g ,pkLEA_2>>,pkJ ) , true )
266 , Eq( v e r i f y ( s i g_3 ,pkLEA_2 ,pkLEA_2) , true )
267 , UniqueFact (<’APRS_3_ordID_resID ’ , ordID , resID>) // avoid rep l ay a t ta c s
268 ]−>
269 [ Out (PFM1)
270 , !APRS_3_PFM1_data(<b1 , ordID>,b2,<d , resID>,<~e1 , ~ pub_resID >,~e2 , ~ s , ~ k , ~ z , cid , pkV_l t
→֒ , pseu ) // used f o r keep ing s t a t e in APRS
271 ]
272
273 ru l e PF_1 :
274 l e t PFM1=<<<b1 , ordID>,<e1 , pub_resID>,h1(<b2 , e2 , aenc (k , pkV_l t ) , senc ( z , k ) , h2(<cid , s>)
→֒ >) , ’GRS4’> , s i g_2>
275 in
276 [ In (PFM1)
277 , ! Pk( ’APRS’ ,pkAPRS) // lookup pub−key o f APRS
278 ]
279 −−[ PF_rec_GRS4_from_APRS(<b1 , ordID>,<e1 , pub_resID>)
280 , Eq( v e r i f y ( s i g_2,<<b1 , ordID>,<e1 , pub_resID>,h1(<b2 , e2 , aenc (k , pkV_l t ) , senc ( z , k ) , h2(<
→֒ cid , s>)>) , ’GRS4’> ,pkAPRS) , true )
281 , UniqueFact (<’PF_1 ’ , pub_resID>) ]−>
282 [ !PF_storage (PFM1) ]
283
284 ru l e APRS_4:
285 l e t PFM1=<<<b1 , ordID>,<e1 , pub_resID>,h1(<b2 , e2 , aenc (k , pkV_l t ) , senc ( z , k ) , h2(<cid , s>)
→֒ >) , ’GRS4’> , s i g_2>
286 in
287 [ !PF_storage (PFM1)
288 , !APRS_3_PFM1_data(<b1 , ordID>,b2,<d , resID>,<e1 , pub_resID>,e2 , s , k , z , cid , pkV_l t , pseu )
→֒ // APRS s t a t e r e l a t ed to resID i s r e s t o r ed here
289 , ! Ltk ( ’APRS’ , skAPRS) // lookup pr ivate−key o f APRS
290 , Fr (~ eta ) // va r i a b l e f o r r e s o l u t i on r e s u l t ( f o r LEA)
291 ]
292 −−[ APRS_sen_GRS6_to_LEA(<d , resID , pseu>,<~eta , pkV_l t >)
293 , Eq( v e r i f y ( s i g_2,<<b1 , ordID>,<e1 , pub_resID>,h1(<b2 , e2 , aenc (k , pkV_l t ) , senc ( z , k ) , h2(<
→֒ cid , s>)>) , ’GRS4’> ,pk (skAPRS) ) , true )
294 ]−>
295 [ Out_S ( ’APRS’ , ’LEA’ ,< s i gn(<<d , resID , pseu>,~ eta >,skAPRS),<<d , resID , pseu>,<~eta , pkV_
→֒ l t >>,’GRS6’>)
296 , Out_S ( ’APRS’ , ’ J ’ ,<ordID , resID , ’GRS6_2’>) // n o t i f i c a t i o n f o r J ( i t can then
→֒ send an in forming order )
297 ]
298
299 ru l e LEA_4 :
300 [ In_S ( ’APRS’ , ’LEA’ ,< sig ,<<d , resID , pseu>,<eta , pkV_l t >>,’GRS6’>)
301 , LEA_3(<d , resID>)
302 , ! Pk( ’APRS’ ,pkAPRS) // lookup pub−key o f APRS
303 ]
304 −−[ LEA_rec_GRS6_from_APRS(<d , resID , pseu>,<eta , pkV_l t >)
305 , Eq( v e r i f y ( s ig ,<<d , resID , pseu>,eta >,pkAPRS) , true )
306 ]−>
307 [ !LEA_4(d,<eta , pkV_l t >) ]
308
309 ru l e J_2 :
310 [ In_S ( ’APRS’ , ’ J ’ ,<ordID , resID , ’GRS6_2’>)
311 , ! J_1( ordID )
61
312 ]
313 −−[ J_r e c e i v e s_in format i on_of_r e s ( ordID , resID )
314 , UniqueFact (<’J_2 ’ , ordID , resID>)
315 ]−>
316 [ J_2( ordID , resID ) ]
317
318 ru l e J_3 :
319 [ J_2( ordID , resID )
320 , Fr (~ b3 ) // va r i ab l e f o r delayed add i t i ona l r e s o l u t i o n order meta data
321 ]
322 −−[ J_sen_GRS7_to_APRS(~b3 , ordID , resID ) ]−>
323 [ Out_S ( ’ J ’ , ’APRS’,<<~b3 , ordID>,resID , ’GRS7’>) ]
324
325 ru l e APRS_5:
326 l e t s i g=s i gn(<<b3 , ordID>,~e3 , b2,<e2 , pub_resID>,aenc (k , pkV_l t ) , senc ( z , k ) , h2(<cid , s>) ,
→֒ s>,skAPRS)
327 PFM2=<<b3 , ordID>,~e3 , b2,<e2 , pub_resID>,aenc (k , pkV_l t ) , senc ( z , k ) , h2(<cid , s>) , s ,
→֒ s ig , ’GRS8’>
328 in
329 [ In_S ( ’ J ’ , ’APRS’,<<b3 , ordID>,resID , ’GRS7’>)
330 , !APRS_3_PFM1_data(<b1 , ordID>,b2,<d , resID>,<e1 , pub_resID>,e2 , s , k , z , cid , pkV_l t , pseu )
→֒ // APRS s t a t e r e l a t ed to b1 i s r e s to r ed here
331 , Fr (~ e3 ) // va r i a b l e f o r delayed add i t i ona l r e s o l u t i on meta data
332 , ! Ltk ( ’APRS’ , skAPRS) // lookup pr ivate−key o f APRS
333 ]
334 −−[ APRS_rec_GRS7_from_J(<b3 , ordID>, resID )
335 , APRS_sen_GRS8_to_PF(<b3 , ordID>,~e3 , b2,<e2 , pub_resID>,pkV_l t , z , k , cid , s , s i g )
336 , UniqueFact (<’APRS_4 ’ , resID>)
337 ]−>
338 [ Out (PFM2) ]
339
340 ru l e PF_2 :
341 l e t s i g=s i gn(<<b3 , ordID>,e3 , b2,<e2 , pub_resID>,aenc (k , pkV_l t ) , senc ( z , k ) , h2(<cid , s>) , s
→֒ >,skAPRS)
342 PFM2=<<b3 , ordID>,e3 , b2,<e2 , pub_resID>,aenc (k , pkV_l t ) , senc ( z , k ) , h2(<cid , s>) , s , s ig
→֒ , ’GRS8’>
343 in
344 [ In (PFM2)
345 , ! Pk( ’APRS’ ,pkAPRS) // lookup pub−key o f APRS
346 ]
347 −−[ PF_rec_GRS8_from_APRS(<b3 , ordID>,pub_resID )
348 , Eq( v e r i f y ( s ig ,<<b3 , ordID>,e3 , b2,<e2 , pub_resID>,aenc (k ,pkV_l t ) , senc ( z , k ) , h2(<cid , s
→֒ >) , s>,pkAPRS) , true )
349 , UniqueFact (<’PF_2 ’ , pub_resID>)
350 ]−>
351 [ !PF_storage (PFM2) ]
352
353 ru l e V_2 :
354 l e t PFM2=<<b3 , ordID>,e3 , b2,<e2 , pub_resID>,enc_k , enc_z , hash_cid , s , s ig , ’GRS8’>
355 PFM1=<<<b1 , ordID>,<e1 , pub_resID>,hash , ’GRS4’>, s i g_2>
356 in
357 [ !V_1(pkV_l t , c i d )
358 , !PF_storage (PFM1)
359 , !PF_storage (PFM2)
360 , ! LtkV($V , skV_l t )
361 ]
362 −−[ Veh i c l e_f i n d s_ta r ge t_data (pkV_l t , sdec ( enc_z , adec ( enc_k , skV_l t ) ) )
363 , Eq( hash , h1(<b2 , e2 , enc_k , enc_z , hash_cid >))
364 , Eq( hash_cid , h2(<cid , s>))
365 , Eq(pk ( skV_l t ) ,pkV_l t )
366 ]−>
367 [ !V_2(pkV_l t , sdec ( enc_z , adec ( enc_k , skV_l t ) ) ) ]
368
369 /∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
370 ∗ 1 . 7 Mal i c i ou s e n t i t i e s
371 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
372 /∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
373 ∗ 1 . 7 . 1 LEA s t e a l s an order and t r i e s to use i t to
374 ∗ r e s o l v e
375 ∗
376 ∗ This ru l e i s r e l ev an t because in the model
377 ∗ order s from J are not leaked , but mal i c i ou s
378 ∗ LEA e n t i t i e s should be cons i d e r ed ( an LEA s t e a l s
379 ∗ an order from another LEA) .
380 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
381
382 ru l e LEA_5 :
383 [ !LEA_2_order(<<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g , pkLEA>, s i gn(<<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g ,pkLEA>>,skJ )>) ]
384 −−[ LEA_leak s_order(<<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g ,pkLEA>,skJ>) ]−>
385 [ Out(<<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g ,pkLEA>, s i gn(<<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g , pkLEA>>,skJ )>) ]
386
387 ru l e LEA_6 :
388 [ !LEA_3_r es_reques t(<<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g ,pkLEA>,<d , resID , pseu>, s i gn(<<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g ,
→֒ pkLEA>>,skJ ) , s i gn (pk (skLEA) ,skLEA) , ’GRS3’>) ]
62
389 −−[ LEA_leak s_reques t(<<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g ,pkLEA>,<d , resID , pseu>,skJ , skLEA>) ]−>
390 [ Out(<<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g ,pkLEA>,<d , resID , pseu>, s i gn(<<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g , pkLEA>>,skJ ) ,
→֒ s i gn (pk (skLEA) ,skLEA) , ’GRS3’>) ]
391
392 ru l e Mal i c i ou s_LEA_1 :
393 [ ! Ltk ( ’MLEA’ , skMLEA) // lookup pr iv a te key o f MLEA
394 ]
395 −−[ Mal i c i ou s_LEA_leaks_i t s_pr i v a te_key ( ) ]−>
396 [ Out (skMLEA) ]
397
398 ru l e Mal i c i ou s_LEA_2 :
399 [ In ( ad_data ) ]
400 −−[ Mal i c i ou s_LEA_sends_r es_reques t_to_APRS_with_data_from_adversary ( ad_data ) ]−>
401 [ Out_S ( ’LEA’ , ’APRS’ , ad_data ) ]
402
403 /∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
404 ∗ 2 . Lemmas
405 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
406 /∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
407 ∗ 2 . 1 Sources lemmas
408 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
409
410 lemma o r i g i n_of_b1_ordID_and_b2 [ sou rce s ] :
411 "
412 Al l b1 ordID e1 pub_resID b2 e2 z s i g_2 k s c i d pkV_l t #i .
413 APRS_sen_GRS4_to_PF(<<b1 , ordID>,<e1 , pub_resID>,<b2 , e2 , k , pkV_l t , z , k , cid , s>>,s i g_
→֒ 2) @ #i
414 ==>
415 ( Ex a g s i g #j .





421 lemma o r i g i n_of_b1_ordID_b2_g_pkLEA_skJ_and_skLEA [ sou rce s ] :
422 "
423 Al l b1 ordID b2 g pkLEA d resID pseu skJ skLEA #i .
424 LEA_leaks_reques t(<<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g ,pkLEA>,<d , resID , pseu>,skJ , skLEA>) @ #i
425 ==>
426 ( Ex a s i g #j #k #l #m.
427 J_sen_GRS2_to_LEA(a,<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g ,pkLEA>, s i g ) @ #j
428 & Reg i s t e r_sk_J ( skJ ) @ #k
429 & Reg i s t e r_sk_LEA(skLEA) @ #l








438 lemma o r i g i n_of_b1_ordID_b2_g_pkLEA_skJ [ sou rce s ] :
439 "
440 Al l b1 ordID b2 g pkLEA skJ #i .
441 LEA_leaks_order(<<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g , pkLEA>,skJ>) @ #i
442 ==>
443 ( Ex a s i g #j #k #l .
444 J_sen_GRS2_to_LEA(a,<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g ,pkLEA>, s i g ) @ #j
445 & Reg i s t e r_sk_J ( skJ ) @ #k








454 ∗ 2 . 2 CID de l i v e r y
455 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
456 /∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
457 ∗ 2 . 2 . 1 Funct i ona l i ty
458 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
459
460 lemma c id_de l i v e r y_i s_fun c t i on a l :
461 // I t i s p o s s i b l e that
462 ex i s t s−t race
463 "
464 Ex c id pkV_l t #i #j .
465 // APRS sends c i d to CIDS
466 APRS_sen_CIDD1_to_CIDS( cid , pkV_l t ) @ #i
467 // and the v e h i c l e f i n d s i t .






473 ∗ 2 . 2 . 2 Secu r i ty
474 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
475
476 lemma c id_i s_not_known_by_the_adversary :
477 a l l−t r a c e s
478 "
479 // Whenever APRS sends c i d to CIDS
480 Al l c i d pkV_l t #i .
481 APRS_sen_CIDD1_to_CIDS( cid , pkV_l t ) @ #i
482 ==>
483 // the adversary w i l l not know the c id .
484 not Ex #i . K( c id ) @ #i
485 "
486
487 lemma c id_i s_not_known_by_other_v e h i c l e s :
488 a l l−t r a c e s
489 "
490 // Whenever APRS sends c i d to CIDS
491 Al l c i d pkV_l t #i .
492 APRS_sen_CIDD1_to_CIDS( cid , pkV_l t ) @ #i
493 ==>
494 // no other v e h i c l e s than the r e c e i v e r w i l l know the c id .
495 not Ex pkV_l t_other #i .
496 Veh i c l e_f i n d s_c id_and_s t o r e s_i t ( cid , pkV_l t_other ) @ #i




501 ∗ 2 . 3 Data import
502 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
503 /∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
504 ∗ 2 . 3 . 1 Funct i ona l i ty
505 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
506 /∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
507 ∗ 2 . 3 . 1 . 1 Data import i s f u nc t i on a l
508 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
509
510 lemma data_import_i s_func t i on a l :
511 // I t i s p o s s i b l e that
512 ex i s t s−t race
513 "
514 Ex pseu pkV_l t #i #j .
515 // PIA sends pseudonym and long term i de n t i t y to APRS
516 PIA_sen_DI_to_APRS( pseu , pkV_l t ) @ #i
517 // and APRS r e c e i v e s the both .





523 ∗ 2 . 3 . 2 Secu r i ty
524 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
525 /∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
526 ∗ 2 . 3 . 2 . 1 Veh i c l e s long term i d en t i t y i s not known by
527 ∗ the adversary
528 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
529
530 lemma ve h i c l e s_long_term_i d en t i t y_s e cu r i t y :
531 a l l−t r a c e s
532 "
533 // Whenever PIA sends pseudonym and long term id en t i t y to ARPS
534 Al l pseu pkV_l t #i .
535 PIA_sen_DI_to_APRS( pseu , pkV_l t ) @ #i
536 ==>
537 // i t should not be that
538 not ( Ex #j .
539 // the adversary knows the long term i d en t i t y
540 K(pkV_l t ) @ #j
541 // without pub l i sh ing the long term i d en t i t y .
542 & ( not Ex #k .







550 ∗ 2 . 4 Generic r e s o l u t i o n system
551 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
552 /∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗




556 ∗ 2 . 4 . 1 . 1 The system i s f un c t i o na l
557 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
558
559 lemma the_system_i s_fun c t i on a l :
560 // I t i s p o s s i b l e that
561 ex i s t s−t race
562 "
563 Ex a b1 ordID b2 e1 pub_resID e2 z s i g s i g_2 s i g_3 s i g_4 d resID pseu k s c i d pkLEA
→֒ pkV_l t g eta b3 e3 #i #j #k #l #m #n #o #p #q #r #s #t .
564 // LEA sends r e s o l u t i o n permi s s i on reques t to J ,
565 LEA_sen_GRS1_to_J ( a ) @ #i
566 // J sends corresponding r e s o l u t i o n order to LEA,
567 & J_sen_GRS2_to_LEA(a,<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g ,pkLEA>, s i g ) @ #j
568 // LEA uses the order to send r e s o l u t i o n reques t to APRS with a pseudonym as an
→֒ argument ,
569 & LEA_sen_GRS3_to_APRS(<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g ,pkLEA>,<d , resID , pseu>, s ig , s i g_3) @ #k
570 // APRS r e c e i v e s the request ,
571 & APRS_rec_GRS3_from_LEA(<<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g ,pkLEA>,<d , resID , pseu>, s ig , s i g_3 , ’GRS3
→֒ ’>) @ #l
572 // APRD sends PFM1 to PF,
573 & APRS_sen_GRS4_to_PF(<<b1 , ordID>,<e1 , pub_resID>,<b2 , e2 , k , pkV_l t , z , k , cid , s>>,s i g_
→֒ 2) @ #l
574 // PF r e c e i v e s the PFM1,
575 & PF_rec_GRS4_from_APRS(<b1 , ordID>,<e1 , pub_resID>) @ #m
576 // APRS sends r e s o l u t i o n r e s u l t to LEA,
577 & APRS_sen_GRS6_to_LEA(<d , resID , pseu>,<eta , pkV_l t >) @ #n
578 // LEA r e c e i v e s the r e s o l u t i o n r e su l t ,
579 & LEA_rec_GRS6_from_APRS(<d , resID , pseu>,<eta , pkV_l t >) @ #o
580 // J r e c e i v e s i n format i on o f the r e s o l u t i on ,
581 & J_r e c e i v e s_in format i on_of_r e s ( ordID , resID ) @ #p
582 // J sends order to pub l i sh PFM2,
583 & J_sen_GRS7_to_APRS(b3 , ordID , resID ) @ #q
584 // APRS r e c e i v e s the order ,
585 & APRS_rec_GRS7_from_J(<b3 , ordID>, resID ) @ #r
586 // APRD sends PFM2 to PF,
587 & APRS_sen_GRS8_to_PF(<b3 , ordID>,e3 , b2,<e2 , pub_resID>,pkV_l t , z , k , cid , s , s i g_4) @ #r
588 // PF r e c e i v e s the PFM2,
589 & PF_rec_GRS8_from_APRS(<b3 , ordID>,pub_resID ) @ #s
590 // and the t a rg e t v eh i c l e f i nd s the ta rg e t data i n s i d e the PFM2
591 & Veh i c l e_f i n d s_ta r g et_data (pkV_l t , z ) @ #t















607 ∗ 2 . 4 . 1 . 2 I f PFM1 and PFM2 with the same pub
608 ∗ r e s o l u t i o n ID are publ i shed ,
609 ∗ then PFM1 i s be for e PFM2
610 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
611
612 lemma i f_PFM1_and_PFM2_with_the_same_resID_are_publ i shed_then_PFM1_i s_be for e_PFM2:
613 a l l−t r a c e s
614 "
615 // Whenever PFM1 and PFM1 with the same r e s o l u t i on ID are publ i shed ,
616 Al l b1 ordID e1 pub_resID b2 b3 e2 e3 z s i g s i g_2 k s c i d pkV_l t #i #j .
617 APRS_sen_GRS4_to_PF(<<b1 , ordID>,<e1 , pub_resID>,<b2 , e2 , k , pkV_l t , z , k , cid , s>>,s i g_
→֒ 2) @ #i
618 & APRS_sen_GRS8_to_PF(<b3 , ordID>,e3 , b2,<e2 , pub_resID>,pkV_l t , z , k , cid , s , s i g ) @ #j





624 ∗ 2 . 4 . 1 . 3 Js order to send PFM2 messages l ead s to
625 ∗ pub l i sh ing a co r r e c t PFM2
626 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
627
628 lemma Js_order_to_send_PFM2_messages_l ead s_to_pub l i sh ing_a_co r r e c t_PFM2:
629
630 // I t i s p o s s i b l e that
631 ex i s t s−t race
632 "
633 // when J order s to send PFM2 messages f o r ordID
65
634 Al l ordID b3 resID #i .
635 J_sen_GRS7_to_APRS(b3 , ordID , resID ) @ #i
636 ==>
637 Ex b1 e1 pub_resID #j #k .
638 // there was PFM1 f o r the ordID
639 PF_rec_GRS4_from_APRS(<b1 , ordID>,<e1 , pub_resID>) @ #j
640 // and PFM2 fo r the ordID i s publ i shed .






647 ∗ 2 . 4 . 1 . 4 I f a PFM2 i s publ i shed , then J
648 ∗ sent order to send PFM2 messages be for e
649 ∗ publ ishment
650 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
651
652 lemma I f_a_PFM2_i s_publ i shed_then_J_sent_order_to_send_PFM2_messages_be for e_
→֒ publ ishment :
653 a l l−t r a c e s
654 "
655 // Whenever PF r e c e i v e s PFM2
656 Al l b3 ordID pub_resID #i .
657 PF_rec_GRS8_from_APRS(<b3 , ordID>,pub_resID ) @ #i
658 ==>
659 Ex resID #j .
660 // J sent order to send PFM2 messages
661 J_sen_GRS7_to_APRS(b3 , ordID , resID ) @ #j






668 ∗ 2 . 4 . 1 . 5 LEA with a r e s o lu t i on order can use the
669 ∗ order to send mu l t i p l e d i f f e r e n t
670 ∗ r e s o l u t i o n r eque s t s
671 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
672
673 lemma LEA_can_use_an_order_to_r e s o l v e_many_times :
674 // I t i s p o s s i b l e that
675 ex i s t s−t race
676 "
677 Ex a b1 ordID b2 d d_2 resID resID_2 pseu pseu_2 g pkLEA s i g s i g_2 #i #j #k .
678 // J sends r e s o l u t i o n order to LEA,
679 J_sen_GRS2_to_LEA(a,<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g ,pkLEA>, s i g ) @ #i
680 // LEA sends a r e s o l u t i on reques t 1 ,
681 & LEA_sen_GRS3_to_APRS(<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g ,pkLEA>,<d , resID , pseu>, s ig , s i g_2) @ #j
682 // LEA sends a r e s o l u t i on reques t 2 ,
683 & LEA_sen_GRS3_to_APRS(<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g ,pkLEA>,<d_2 , resID_2 , pseu_2>, s ig , s i g_2) @ #
→֒ k
684 // r e s o l u t i o n reques t 1 i s sent be for e r e s o l u t i o n reques t 2 ,
685 & j<k
686 // J sent the r e s o l u t i o n order be for e r e s o l u t i on reques t 1 ,
687 & i<j
688 // and r e s o l u t i o n reques t 1 i s not the same than r e s o lu t i on reques t 2 .
689 & not (d = d_2)




694 ∗ 2 . 4 . 1 . 6 Adversary knows b1 and e1 a f t e r
695 ∗ a PFM1
696 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
697
698 lemma adversary_knows_b1_and_e1_a f t e r_a_PFM1:
699 // I t i s p o s s i b l e that
700 ex i s t s−t race
701 "
702 // when the APRS sends a PFM1
703 Al l b1 ordID e1 pub_resID b2 e2 k pkV_l t z c i d s s i g_2 #i .
704 APRS_sen_GRS4_to_PF(<<b1 , ordID>,<e1 , pub_resID>,<b2 , e2 , k , pkV_l t , z , k , cid , s>>,s i g_
→֒ 2) @ #i
705 ==>
706 Ex #j .
707 // the adversary w i l l know b1 and e1 .
708 K(b1 ) @ #j





714 ∗ 2 . 4 . 1 . 7 Adversary knows b2 , b3 , e2 and
66
715 ∗ e3 a f t e r a PFM2
716 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
717
718 lemma adversary_knows_b2_b3_e2_and_e3_a f t e r_a_PFM2:
719 // I t i s p o s s i b l e that
720 ex i s t s−t race
721 "
722 // when the APRS sends a PFM2
723 Al l b3 ordID e3 b2 e2 pub_resID pkV_l t z k c id s s i g #i .
724 APRS_sen_GRS8_to_PF(<b3 , ordID>,e3 , b2,<e2 , pub_resID>,pkV_l t , z , k , cid , s , s i g ) @ #i
725 ==>
726 Ex #j .
727 // the adversary w i l l know b2 , b3 , e2 , and e3 .
728 K(b2 ) @ #j
729 & K(b3 ) @ #j
730 & K( e2 ) @ #j





736 ∗ 2 . 4 . 1 . 8 A v eh i c l e can read ta rg e t data publ i shed
737 ∗ f o r i t
738 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
739
740 lemma a_ve h i c l e_can_read_ta rg e t_data_publ i shed_f o r_i t :
741 // I t i s p o s s i b l e that
742 ex i s t s−t race
743 " // when the APRS pub l i s hes a ta rg e t data
744 Al l b3 ordID e3 b2 e2 pub_resID pkV_l t z k c id s s i g #i .
745 APRS_sen_GRS8_to_PF(<b3 , ordID>,e3 , b2,<e2 , pub_resID>,pkV_l t , z , k , cid , s , s i g ) @ #i
746 ==> // the t a rg e t can f i nd i t .
747 Ex #j .




752 ∗ 2 . 4 . 2 Secu r i ty
753 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
754 /∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
755 ∗ 2 . 4 . 2 . 1 Pseudonym r e s o l u t i o n l ead s to pub l i sh ing
756 ∗ a PFM1
757 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
758
759 lemma re s_l ead s_to_pub l i sh ing_a_PFM1:
760 a l l−t r a c e s
761 "
762 // Whenever the LEA r e c e i v e s a r e s o l u t i o n re su l t ,
763 Al l d resID pseu eta pkV_l t #i .
764 LEA_rec_GRS6_from_APRS(<d , resID , pseu>,<eta , pkV_l t >) @ #i
765 & not ( Ex ad_data #j . Mal i c i ou s_LEA_sends_r e s_reques t_to_APRS_with_data_from_
→֒ adversary ( ad_data ) @ #j )
766 ==>
767 // the corresponding PFM1 was publ i shed .
768 Ex b1 d resID ordID b2 g s i g e1 e2 z s i g_2 s i g_3 pub_resID pseu k s c i d pkLEA
→֒ pkV_l t #j #k #l .
769 LEA_sen_GRS3_to_APRS(<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g ,pkLEA>,<d , resID , pseu>, s ig , s i g_2) @ #j
770 & APRS_rec_GRS3_from_LEA(<<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g ,pkLEA>,<d , resID , pseu>, s ig , s i g_2 , ’
→֒ GRS3’>) @ #k
771 & APRS_sen_GRS4_to_PF(<<b1 , ordID>,<e1 , pub_resID>,<b2 , e2 , k , pkV_l t , z , k , cid , s>>,
→֒ s i g_3) @ #k







779 ∗ 2 . 4 . 2 . 2 I f a PFM1 i s publ i shed , then
780 ∗ r e s o l u t i o n happened
781 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
782
783 lemma i f_a_PFM1_i s_publ i shed_then_r e s_happened :
784 a l l−t r a c e s
785 "
786 // Whenever a PFM1 i s publ i shed ,
787 Al l b1 ordID e1 pub_resID #i .
788 PF_rec_GRS4_from_APRS(<b1 , ordID>,<e1 , pub_resID>) @ #i
789 & not ( Ex ad_data #j . Mal i c i ou s_LEA_sends_r e s_reques t_to_APRS_with_data_from_
→֒ adversary ( ad_data ) @ #j )
790 ==>
791 // the corresponding r e s o l u t i on happened be for e that .
792 Ex g b2 e2 z s i g s i g_2 s i g_3 d resID pseu k s c i d pkLEA pkV_l t ordID pub_resID #
→֒ j #k .
67
793 LEA_sen_GRS3_to_APRS(<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g ,pkLEA>,<d , resID , pseu>, s ig , s i g_2) @ #j
794 & APRS_rec_GRS3_from_LEA(<<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g ,pkLEA>,<d , resID , pseu>, s ig , s i g_2 , ’
→֒ GRS3’>) @ #k
795 & APRS_sen_GRS4_to_PF(<<b1 , ordID>,<e1 , pub_resID>,<b2 , e2 , k , pkV_l t , z , k , cid , s>>,






801 ∗ 2 . 4 . 2 . 3 Only LEA with permi s s i on from J can
802 ∗ r e s o l v e
803 ∗
804 ∗ When J s i gn s an order , LEA ID i s a l s o s igned .
805 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
806
807 lemma s t o l en_order s_cannot_be_used_f o r_r es :
808 a l l−t r a c e s
809 "
810 // Whenever a mal i c i ou s LEA sends an r e s o l u t i o n reques t with a s t o l en order
811 Al l ad_data #i .
812 Mal i c i ou s_LEA_sends_r es_reques t_to_APRS_with_data_from_adversary ( ad_data ) @ #i
813 & not ( Ex reques t #i . LEA_leaks_reques t ( r eques t ) @ #i )
814
815 ==>
816 // the APRS does not accept the r eques t .
817 not ( Ex data #j .






824 ∗ 2 . 4 . 2 . 4 a i s not known by the adversary
825 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
826
827 lemma a_i s_not_known_by_the_adversary :
828 a l l−t r a c e s
829 "
830 // Whenever a LEA sends a r e s o l u t i o n permi s s i on reques t alpha to a J
831 Al l a #i .
832 LEA_sen_GRS1_to_J ( a ) @ #i
833 ==>
834 // i t should not be that
835 not ( Ex #j .
836 // the adversary knows the alpha .





842 ∗ 2 . 4 . 2 . 5 b1 i s not known by the adversary be for e
843 ∗ a PFM1 (LEA1 can use the b1 f o r many
844 ∗ que r i e s )
845 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
846
847 lemma b1_i s_not_known_by_the_adversary_be for e_a_PFM_1 :
848 a l l−t r a c e s
849 "
850 // Whenever r e s o l u t i o n happens
851 Al l d resID pseu a b1 ordID b2 g pkLEA s i g eta pkV_l t #i #j .
852 (
853 (
854 LEA_rec_GRS2_from_J(a,<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g ,pkLEA>, s i g ) @ #i
855 & LEA_rec_GRS6_from_APRS(<d , resID , pseu>,<eta , pkV_l t >) @ #j
856 & not ( Ex order #i . LEA_leak s_order ( order ) @ #i )
857 & not ( Ex reques t #i . LEA_leaks_reques t ( r eques t ) @ #i )
858 )
859 ==> // i t should not be that
860 (
861 not ( Ex #m.
862 // the adversary knows b1
863 K(b1 ) @ #m
864 // without a PFM1 from APRS conta in ing b1 .
865 & not (Ex e1 pub_resID e2 z s i g_2 k s c i d pkV_l t #n . APRS_sen_GRS4_to_PF(<<b1 ,







872 ∗ 2 . 4 . 2 . 6 b2 i s not known by the adversary be for e




876 lemma b2_i s_not_known_by_the_adversary_be for e_PFM_2 :
877 a l l−t r a c e s
878 "
879 // Whenever r e s o l u t i o n happens
880 Al l d resID pseu b1 ordID b2 g pkLEA s i g s i g_2 eta pkV_l t #i #j .
881 LEA_sen_GRS3_to_APRS(<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g ,pkLEA>,<d , resID , pseu>, s ig , s i g_2) @ #i
882 & LEA_rec_GRS6_from_APRS(<d , resID , pseu>,<eta , pkV_l t >) @ #j
883 & not ( Ex order #i . LEA_leak s_order ( order ) @ #i )
884 & not ( Ex reques t #i . LEA_leaks_reques t ( r eques t ) @ #i )
885 ==>
886 // i t should not be that
887 not ( Ex #m.
888 // the adversary knows a b2
889 K(b2 ) @ #m
890 // without a PFM 2 from the APRS conta in ing the b2 .
891 & not (Ex b3 e3 e2 pub_resID pkV_l t k z c i d s s i g_3 #n . APRS_sen_GRS8_to_PF(<





896 ∗ 2 . 4 . 2 . 7 b3 i s not known by the adversary be for e
897 ∗ a PFM2
898 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
899
900 lemma b3_i s_not_known_by_the_adversary_be for e_PFM_2 :
901 a l l−t r a c e s
902 "
903 // Whenever r e s o l u t i o n happens and J dec ides to inform
904 Al l d resID pseu b1 ordID b2 g pkLEA s i g s i g_2 eta pkV_l t b3 #i #j #k .
905 LEA_sen_GRS3_to_APRS(<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g ,pkLEA>,<d , resID , pseu>, s ig , s i g_2) @ #i
906 & LEA_rec_GRS6_from_APRS(<d , resID , pseu>,<eta , pkV_l t >) @ #j
907 & J_sen_GRS7_to_APRS(b3 , ordID , resID ) @ #k
908 ==>
909 // i t should not be that
910 not ( Ex #m.
911 // the adversary knows b3
912 K(b3 ) @ #m
913 // without a PFM 2 from the APRS conta in ing b3 .
914 & not (Ex e3 e2 pub_resID pkV_l t k z c i d s s i g_3 #n . APRS_sen_GRS8_to_PF(<b3 ,





919 ∗ 2 . 4 . 2 . 8 g i s not known by the adversary
920 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
921
922 lemma g_i s_not_known_by_the_adversary :
923 a l l−t r a c e s
924 " // Whenever a J sends a r e s o l u t i o n order gamma to LEA
925 Al l a b1 ordID b2 g pkLEA s i g #i .
926 J_sen_GRS2_to_LEA(a,<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g ,pkLEA>, s i g ) @ #i
927 & not ( Ex order #i . LEA_leak s_order ( order ) @ #i )
928 & not ( Ex reques t #i . LEA_leaks_reques t ( r eques t ) @ #i )
929
930 ==>
931 // i t should not be that
932 not ( Ex #j .
933 // the adversary knows the g .





939 ∗ 2 . 4 . 2 . 9 d i s not known by the adversary
940 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
941
942 lemma d_i s_not_known_by_the_adversary :
943 a l l−t r a c e s
944 " // Whenever a LEA sends a d to the APRS
945 Al l b1 ordID b2 g pkLEA d resID pseu s i g s i g_2 #i .
946 LEA_sen_GRS3_to_APRS(<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g ,pkLEA>,<d , resID , pseu>, s ig , s i g_2) @ #i
947 & not ( Ex order #i . LEA_leak s_order ( order ) @ #i )
948 & not ( Ex reques t #i . LEA_leaks_reques t ( r eques t ) @ #i )
949 ==>
950 // i t should not be that
951 not ( Ex #j .
952 // the adversary knows the d .






958 ∗ Lemma " e1 i s not known by the adversary be for e
959 ∗ a PFM 1" i s not r e l e van t s i n c e the e1 i s generated
960 ∗ by the APRS ju s t be for e sending i t to the PF




965 ∗ 2 . 4 . 2 . 1 0 e2 i s not known by the adversary be for e
966 ∗ a PFM 2
967 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
968
969 lemma e2_i s_not_known_by_the_adversary_be for e_PFM_2 :
970 a l l−t r a c e s
971 " // Whenever the APRS generate s an e2
972 Al l b1 ordID e1 pub_resID b2 e2 pkV_l t z k c id s s i g_2 #i .
973 APRS_sen_GRS4_to_PF(<<b1 , ordID>,<e1 , pub_resID>,<b2 , e2 , k , pkV_l t , z , k , cid , s>>,s i g_
→֒ 2) @ #i
974 ==>
975 // i t should not be that
976 not ( Ex #m.
977 // the adversary knows the e2
978 K( e2 ) @ #m
979 // without a PFM 2 from the APRS conta in ing the e2 .
980 & not (Ex e3 b3 ordID_2 pub_resID_2 pkV_l t_2 k_2 z_2 c id_2 s_2 s i g_3 #n . APRS_
→֒ sen_GRS8_to_PF(<b3 , ordID_2>,e3 , b2,<e2 , pub_resID_2>,pkV_l t_2 , z_2 ,k_2 , c i d_





985 ∗ Lemma " e3 i s not known by the adversary be for e
986 ∗ a PFM 2" i s not r e l e van t s i n c e the e3 i s generated
987 ∗ by the APRS ju s t be for e sending i t to the PF




992 ∗ 2 . 4 . 2 . 1 1 Target data z i s not known by the adversary
993 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
994
995 lemma z_i s_not_known_by_the_adversary :
996 a l l−t r a c e s
997 " // Whenever the APRS pub l i s hes a PFM 2
998 Al l b1 ordID e1 pub_resID b2 e2 pkV_l t z k c id s s i g_2 #i .
999 APRS_sen_GRS4_to_PF(<<b1 , ordID>,<e1 , pub_resID>,<b2 , e2 , k , pkV_l t , z , k , cid , s>>,s i g_
→֒ 2) @ #i
1000 ==>
1001 // i t should not be that the adversary knows the t a rg e t data z .




1006 ∗ 2 . 4 . 2 . 1 2 eta i s not known by the adversary
1007 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
1008
1009 lemma eta_i s_not_known_by_the_adversary :
1010 a l l−t r a c e s
1011 " // Whenever the APRS generate s a r e s o l u t i o n r e s u l t eta
1012 Al l d resID pseu eta pkV_l t #i .
1013 APRS_sen_GRS6_to_LEA(<d , resID , pseu>,<eta , pkV_l t >) @ #i
1014 ==>
1015 // i t should not be that the adversary knows the r e s u l t eta
1016 not Ex #i . K( eta ) @ #i




1021 ∗ 2 . 4 . 2 . 1 3 An r e s o l u t i o n reques t i s handled only
1022 ∗ once ( avoid ing rep l ay at tacks )
1023 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
1024
1025 lemma an_r es_reques t_i s_handled_only_once :
1026 a l l−t r a c e s
1027 "
1028 // Whenever a LEA sends a r e s o l u t i o n reques t to the APRS,
1029 Al l b1 ordID b2 g pkLEA d resID pseu s i g s i g_2 #i .
1030 LEA_sen_GRS3_to_APRS(<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g ,pkLEA>,<d , resID , pseu>, s ig , s i g_2) @ #i
1031 ==>
1032 // the APRS handles the r eques t only once .
1033 not Ex pkLEA_2 s i g_1 s i g_3 #j #k .
1034 APRS_rec_GRS3_from_LEA(<<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g ,pkLEA_2>,<d , resID , pseu>, s i g_1 , s i g_
→֒ 3 , ’GRS3’>) @ #j
70
1035 & APRS_rec_GRS3_from_LEA(<<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g ,pkLEA_2>,<d , resID , pseu>, s i g_1 , s i g_
→֒ 3 , ’GRS3’>) @ #k





1041 ∗ 2 . 4 . 2 . 1 4 I f a r e s o l u t i o n happens with a pseudonym
1042 ∗ as a r e s o l u t i o n argument the corresponding
1043 ∗ r e s u l t con ta in s always the c o r r e c t ho lde r
1044 ∗ long term i d en t i t y
1045 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
1046
1047 lemma r e s o lu t i on_r e s u l t_corresponds_to_r e s o l u t i o n_argument :
1048 a l l−t r a c e s
1049 "
1050 // Whenever
1051 Al l pseu pkV_l t b1 ordID b2 g pkLEA d resID s i g s i g_3 eta pkV_l t_2 #i #j #k .
1052 // PIA sends pseudonym and the corresponding long term i d en t i t y to the APRS,
1053 PIA_sen_DI_to_APRS( pseu , pkV_l t ) @ #i
1054 // LEA sends r e s o l u t i o n regues t with the pseudonym ,
1055 & LEA_sen_GRS3_to_APRS(<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g ,pkLEA>,<d , resID , pseu>, s ig , s i g_3) @ #j
1056 // and LEA r e c e i v e s a r e s o l u t i o n r e s u l t
1057 & LEA_rec_GRS6_from_APRS(<d , resID , pseu>,<eta , pkV_l t_2>) @ #k
1058 ==>
1059 // the long−term i d en t i t y in the r e s u l t corresponds to the argument pseudonym .




1064 ∗ 2 . 4 . 2 . 1 5 Only author i zed LEA can r e s o l v e
1065 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗/
1066
1067 lemma only_author i zed_LEA_can_r e s o l v e :
1068 a l l−t r a c e s
1069 "
1070 // Whenever
1071 Al l d resID pseu eta pkV_l t #i .
1072 // a LEA r e c e i v e s a r e s o l u t i o n r e s u l t
1073 LEA_rec_GRS6_from_APRS(<d , resID , pseu>,<eta , pkV_l t >) @ #i
1074 // and no r e s o l u t i o n reque s t s have been leaked ,
1075 & not ( Ex reques t #j . LEA_leaks_reques t ( r eques t ) @ #j )
1076 ==>
1077 Ex a b1 ordID b2 g pkLEA s i g s i g_3 #j #k .
1078 // the judge author i zed the r e s o l u t i on
1079 J_sen_GRS2_to_LEA(a,<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g ,pkLEA>, s i g ) @ #j
1080 // and the LEA used the autho r i z at i on to r e s o l v e .
1081 & LEA_sen_GRS3_to_APRS(<b1 , ordID>,b2,<g ,pkLEA>,<d , resID , pseu>, s ig , s i g_3) @ #k
1082 & #j<#i
1083 "
1084
1085 end
71
